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ABSTRACT 
Identifying Critical Risk Factors in the Decision-Making Process of Angel Investors 
 and Venture Capitalists: A Delphi Research Study 
by 
Shawn A. Carson 
Entrepreneurs perceive and manage risk differently than investors (Palich & Bagby, 1995).  As a 
result, entrepreneurs may underestimate the extent to which their ventures are perceived to be 
risky by a potential investor. Consequently, the entrepreneur is left with making assumptions that 
could be detrimental in obtaining the necessary capital to launch and grow the business.  The 
purpose of this study was to determine if there is a common set of perceived critical risk factors 
among a group of experienced investors that would cause them to reject a deal out of hand. 
 
The research methodology chosen for this study was the Delphi Technique, which consisted of 
three rounds of surveys with a group of 18 experienced Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists.  
The process identified 82 critical risk factors across 7 categories.  Over half of these factors were 
rated between ‘Important’ and ‘Critically Important’ at a consensus rate of greater then 70%.  
Each participant reported an average of 11 critical risk factors, yet they rated more than 40 as 
‘Important’ or ‘Critically Important’, suggesting there are conscious and subconscious factors 
involved in the decision process.   Subjective factors such as relationship were rated with higher 
importance than more objective measurable factors such as revenue or market share.  Venture 
Capitalists, as a group, had higher rates of consensus than the Angel Investors and there were 
distinct differences between each group regarding which factors are most important.   
 
The study is significant because it rated subjective based factors along with objective factors 
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showing that investors tend to place more importance on trust and relationship building in the 
early stages of the investment process.  The study also provided a framework for understanding 
the complexity of investment decision-making for the benefit of investors, entrepreneurs, and 
those who educate and mentor entrepreneurs.  Finally, the study is significant for helping 
entrepreneurs understand the differences in perspective between Angel Investors and Venture 
Capitalists. 
 
 
  
  4 
Copyright 2018 by Shawn A. Carson 
All Rights Reserved 
  
  5 
DEDICATION 
 
To Alice H. Carson: my wife, my love, my partner for 32 years.  Thank you for your 
support and encouragement on the many paths we have taken together. 
  
  6 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 This dissertation represents the end of a four-year journey that began in a discussion with 
Dr. Andrew Czuchry, who convinced me to take this path and committed to stay with me 
through the end of it.  The other bookend of this adventure is embodied in my Dissertation Chair, 
Dr. Hal Knight, who encouraged me to try a different approach, who granted me a lot of 
freedom, and who put up with my occasional rants along the way.   
 Two people who gave me pivotal advice at the very beginning are Dr. Fred Tompkins 
and Dr. David Hines.  Without their insight and encouragement, I might not have taken the leap. 
 I hold special appreciation for the rest of the Dissertation Committee: Dr. James 
Lampley, Dr. William Flora, and of course, Dr. Czuchry.  They were all willing to let me color 
outside the lines a bit and for that, I am grateful. 
 This dissertation would have headed for a ditch on more than one occasion were it not for 
Dr. David Williams of the University of Tennessee, who was always available to offer 
suggestions, opinions, and general guidance. 
 Many of the participants of this study are personal acquaintances.  Their willingness and 
excitement to participate in the study was inspirational and all of them stuck with the process 
through three arduous rounds of surveys.  I am grateful for their expertise and their willingness 
to share it. 
 Finally, I would not have remained on this path had the Creator of the Universe not 
accompanied me on my long walks through His garden. 
 Truly, one cannot do this alone! 
 
 
 
  
  7 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... 2 
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................................ 5 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ 6 
Chapter 
1.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 12 
Statement of the Problem .................................................................................................. 15 
Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 15 
Significance of the Study .................................................................................................. 15 
Limitations and Delimitations........................................................................................... 16 
Definition of Terms........................................................................................................... 17 
Chapter Overview ............................................................................................................. 18 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................................ 19 
Risk and the Entrepreneur ................................................................................................. 20 
The Entrepreneur .......................................................................................................................... 20 
Defining Risk, Uncertainty, and Failure ....................................................................................... 21 
Attitudes About Risk and Risk Tolerance .................................................................................... 22 
Risk: An Entrepreneurial Characteristic ....................................................................................... 23 
Entrepreneurs and the Management of Risk ................................................................................. 24 
Investors and the Perception of Risk ................................................................................ 25 
  8 
The Game of Investing ................................................................................................................. 25 
Decision Analysis ......................................................................................................................... 26 
Prediction, Control, and Trust ....................................................................................................... 27 
Enter: The Use of Heuristics ......................................................................................................... 27 
The Stages of Investment – The Concept of Timing .................................................................... 29 
The Organization of Risk .................................................................................................. 31 
The Early Development of Categories .......................................................................................... 31 
Later Developments in Risk Categorization ................................................................................. 33 
Quality of the Leadership Team ................................................................................................... 34 
Relationship Risk .............................................................................................................. 35 
Failure in the First Meeting: Building or Damaging Trust ........................................................... 36 
The Double-Sided Moral Hazard .................................................................................................. 38 
Telling the Company Story ........................................................................................................... 38 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 39 
3.  RESEARCH METHOD........................................................................................................... 40 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 40 
Purpose Statement ............................................................................................................. 41 
Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 41 
The Delphi Method ........................................................................................................... 41 
The Structure of the Delphi Method ............................................................................................. 42 
Sampling ........................................................................................................................... 44 
  9 
Sample Size ................................................................................................................................... 44 
Choice of Participants ................................................................................................................... 44 
Recruitment and Onboarding ........................................................................................................ 45 
Instrumentation ................................................................................................................. 46 
Survey 1 ........................................................................................................................................ 47 
Survey 2 ........................................................................................................................................ 47 
Survey 3 ........................................................................................................................................ 48 
Reliability and Validity ................................................................................................................. 49 
Data Collection ................................................................................................................. 51 
Data Analysis ........................................................................................................ 52 
Survey 1 ........................................................................................................................................ 52 
Survey 2 ........................................................................................................................................ 53 
Survey 3 ........................................................................................................................................ 53 
Final Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 53 
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 54 
4.  DATA COLLECTION ............................................................................................................ 55 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 55 
Purpose Statement ............................................................................................................. 55 
Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 55 
Participants and Demographics ......................................................................................... 56 
Survey Distributions and Response Rate .......................................................................... 58 
Survey 1: Construction, Methodology and Response Data .......................................................... 58 
Survey 2: Construction, Methodology and Response Data .............................................. 62 
  10 
Survey 3: Construction, Methodology and Response Data .............................................. 66 
Consensus Effect ............................................................................................................... 66 
Analysis of Consensus ...................................................................................................... 67 
Comparing Angel Investors with Venture Capitalists ...................................................... 70 
5.  DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................ 73 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 73 
Research Questions ........................................................................................................... 73 
Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 74 
Research Question 1 ..................................................................................................................... 74 
Research Question 2 ..................................................................................................................... 74 
Research Question 3 ..................................................................................................................... 75 
Research Question 4 ..................................................................................................................... 76 
Conclusions Regarding the Delphi Method and the Consensus Effect ........................................ 77 
Implications of the Study .................................................................................................. 78 
Recommendations for Further Research ........................................................................... 81 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................. 83 
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................................. 90 
Appendix A: Delphi Surveys ............................................................................................ 90 
Appendix B: Total Listing of Critical Risk Factors from Survey #1 .............................. 118 
Appendix C:  Full Listing of Survey #2 Results – Unranked ......................................... 121 
Appendix D:  Ranked Consensus Data by Consensus Range ......................................... 124 
Appendix E:  Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists .................................................. 129 
VITA ........................................................................................................................................... 131 
  11 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table                 Page 
 
1.  A Summary of Entrepreneurial Characteristics…………………………………………….. 24 
 
2.  Risk Perceptions from Angels Who Reject Deals………………………………………….. 32 
3.  Summary of Relationship Risk Factors…………………………………………………….. 37 
4.  Participants’ Demographics………………………………………………………………… 57 
5.  Critical Risk Factors by Category…………………………………………………………... 60 
6.  Critical Risk Factors Ranked by Mean Values (Top Two Quartiles)………………………. 64 
7.  Distribution of Critical Risk Factors Across Range of Consensus…………………………. 69 
8.  Ranking of Critical Risk Factors with at least 70% Consensus…………………………….. 69 
 
9.  Comparison of Consensus Between Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists……………... 71 
10. Comparison of Final Consensus Rankings…………………………………………………. 72 
 
 
 
    
  
  12 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Entrepreneurship is hard.  It is hard for many reasons but principally, it is hard because 
for a specific business idea, in a specific place and time, no one has ever done it before.  Previous 
experience does not guarantee success and there are no roadmaps with specific directions to 
bring one to a destination. Research in entrepreneurship is still in its infancy and the rapid pace 
of change makes it difficult to find common formulas.  But some do exist and more are coming.  
This study was about developing a framework to help entrepreneurs understand risk from the 
perspective of potential investors, which can be used in the development of a company 
presentation and increase the odds of securing funding. 
The genesis of this dissertation resulted from a career in assisting entrepreneurs to 
prepare for the task of raising capital from investors.  After observing hundreds of interactions 
between entrepreneurs and investors in a number of settings, one thing became clear; it is 
complicated, time consuming, and usually ends in frustration.  The process centers around 
predicting the future with very little information and a high degree of uncertainty.  The operative 
word is risk.  But such a simple word carries an endless opportunity for interpretation and 
observation in so many different contexts.  
Entrepreneurship has many definitions.  Some people associate entrepreneurship with 
starting businesses.  Other definitions involve the assumption of risk.  One that is quite suitable 
for this study was proposed by Barringer and Ireland (2016).  They defined entrepreneurship as 
“the process by which individuals pursue opportunities without regard to resources they currently 
control for the purpose of exploiting future goods and services” (p.7).  A common scenario might 
be one where a person observes a problem and conceives a solution.  This entrepreneur must find 
people, materials, skills, services, and processes; not only to develop a prototype, but to also 
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launch a business entity.  All of this eventually takes money to accomplish, which is yet another 
resource, usually outside the control of the entrepreneur. 
Entrepreneurs must attract enough capital to launch a business, develop a product or 
service, convince customers to buy it, and build out the company so the business can grow to 
meet the demand.  Those who are lucky enough to generate revenue early can grow the company 
organically or fuel growth with profits based on the company’s sales.  But for many, the cost to 
start the business is very high.  Patent costs can run over $15,000 (Quinn, 2015).  Business 
registration and legal documentation can run $5,000 - $6,000 (Shulga, 2014).  Website 
development can run from $7,000 to over $250,000 (Parr, 2016).  Franchise fees range from tens 
of thousands to $100,000 or more (Libava, 2017).  To open a McDonald’s restaurant, one needs 
a half million dollars in cash, and the total investment is between $1 and $2.2 million 
(Daszkowski, 2017).  For most startups, the funding to launch the business is found from 
personal assets and those of friends and family.  But for many, the cost far exceeds those 
resources.   
Entrepreneurs who find themselves in capital intensive ventures often seek funding from 
investors who provide cash in return for an equity ownership position in the company, and the 
expectation of a huge return.  There are two types of investors that were researched in this study; 
Angels and Venture Capitalists.  Angels are wealthy individuals who invest their own money in 
startups (Greathouse, 2012; Wiltbank, Read, Dew, & Sarasvathy, 2009). Venture Capitalists, or 
VC’s, invest third party funds in early stage startups (Greathouse, 2012).  The Angel Resource 
Institute (2016) reported the median angel investor deal in 2016 was $950,000; a substantial 
increase from $510,000 in 2014.  The odds of getting an investment were about 3%.  Hudson 
(2016) reported there were over 71,000 deals in 2016 in the US.  We can extrapolate there were 
just under 2.4 million entrepreneurs seeking investment funding from investors in 2016. 
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The process of raising capital is arduous.   The entrepreneur must assemble a PowerPoint 
slide presentation and set about presenting it anywhere and everywhere from pitch competitions 
to dozens of private meetings.  The content of these presentations has long been formulaic. 
Kawasaki (2004) proposed the famous 10/20/30 rule, which is basically 10 slides in 20 minutes, 
and nothing smaller than a 30-point font.  This became a standard for many who coach and 
mentor entrepreneurs (Kawasaki, 2014; Yekutiel, 2014; Conrad, 2015).  The result was a 
standard and efficient script however it lacked basic elements of good storytelling and could 
leave potential investors with the perception of a lack of legitimacy in the new venture (Garud, 
Schildt, & Lant, 2014).  
The audience for these presentations is the investor community and they care about 
making a return.  They are putting their money at risk and it is their desire to understand and 
evaluate that risk in order to make their investment decisions.  The idea that entrepreneurs are 
risk takers is a commonly held belief.  However, Palich and Bagby (1995) proposed that 
entrepreneurs are not necessarily predisposed toward risk any more than anyone else.  They 
tended to frame an opportunity in context of achieving a positive outcome.  Investors, on the 
other hand, sought to manage their risk by applying an analytically intense process commonly 
known as due diligence, but that process is time consuming and expensive.  In order to filter 
interesting opportunities worthy of due diligence, investors tended to rely on more subjective 
measures.  Wiltbank, Read, Dew, and Sarasvathy (2007) proposed that investors used a dual set 
of risk mitigation strategies: predictive (analytical) and control (personal experience).  They 
found that control strategies tended to experience fewer failures than the predictive strategies.  
Investors too, it seems, deploy a certain amount of decision making based on their gut.  But what 
we have is a gap between perspectives. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Palich and Bagby (1995) indicated that entrepreneurs perceive, process, and manage risk 
differently than investors.  As a result, entrepreneurs may underestimate or disregard the extent 
to which their ventures are perceived to be risky in the eye of a potential investor.  This may lead 
the entrepreneur to fail to incorporate risk mitigation strategies during the formation of their 
business plans and company narratives.  However, with little or no insight into how investors 
perceive and identify risks, the entrepreneur is left with making assumptions that could be 
detrimental to obtaining the necessary capital to launch and grow the business.  The purpose of 
this Delphi study was to determine if there is a common set of perceived critical risk factors 
among a group of experienced investors that could cause them to reject a deal out of hand. 
Research Questions 
1. To what extent are critical risk factors involved in the decision-making process of 
investors in considering an investment? 
2. Which critical risk factors (execution, market, technological, financial, regulatory, etc.) 
do investors consider to be common among most investment decisions? 
3. Of these most common critical risk factors, what is the relative weight of importance 
among them? 
4. What differences occur among the critical risk factors between Angel investors and 
Venture Capitalists? 
Significance of the Study 
 This study is significant to entrepreneurs directly because many identify specific risk 
categories for developing themes of risk mitigation strategies.  A set of weighted risk categories 
may form a framework with which to compare strategic and tactical elements and to help 
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identify weaknesses in the business plan.  This framework will help strengthen the company 
narrative to better communicate value to investors, stakeholders, and for marketing purposes. 
 The study may also be significant to investors, especially as they organize into 
investment groups, to determine the overall investment profile and preferences of the investors, 
and to better communicate to potential entrepreneurs these characteristics. 
 Finally, this study may be significant to the educators, mentors, and coaches who provide 
guidance and advise to entrepreneurs.  The critical risk factors identified in this study may 
provide a logical framework for these advisors and educators to teach entrepreneur how to 
increase the odds of winning an investment.  
Limitations and Delimitations 
 Inherent in the Delphi approach is the selection of experts who possess sufficient 
experience and expertise to offer insight into their investment decision making process.  This 
study will be delimited to the subset of investors who are identified as experts for the purposes of 
this study. The following set of criteria were developed to determine the participants in the study: 
 Five or more years’ experience in equity investing.  This length of time is considered 
necessary to have seen a large number of deals across a wide range of potential markets.  
It is also important for enough deals to have matured or concluded in failure so the 
investor has a sense of what worked and what failed. 
 A minimum of 10 investments.  Higgins (2008) found that 20 – 30% of investment deals 
provide a significant return and roughly the same amount utterly fail.  The remainder 
provide only a moderate return.  A minimum of 10 investments insures enough 
experience to witness these odds come to fruition. 
 Primary decision-making authority.  Some investors invest through groups or through 
funds, where the decisions are usually made through majority vote of the group.  Having 
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primary decision-making authority means the investor can act independently on his or her 
own set of decision criteria. 
This study will be further delimited to investors located in the states of Tennessee, 
Kentucky, Ohio, and Georgia.  This region represents the majority of investment sources 
available to most startups located in the area.  The region is also where the researcher has direct 
access to the population of investors from which to recruit for the study through personal 
networks and professional associations. 
The delimitation to the southeastern US creates a limitation based on economic and 
industry perceptions of the investors.  Average investments in the region tend to be about 75% of 
those in California and there is a strong preference on the coasts for software and life science 
companies (Angel Resource Institute, 2016).  As a result, entrepreneurs may face a different set 
of critical risk factors as they seek funding outside the region.    
Definition of Terms 
1. Entrepreneurship - the process by which individuals pursue opportunities without regard 
to resources they currently control for the purpose of exploiting future goods and services 
(Barrenger & Ireland, 2016, p. 13). 
2. Angel Investors (Angels) - wealthy individuals who invest their own money in startups 
(Wiltbank, Read, Dew, & Sarasvathy, 2009; Greathouse, 2012). 
3. Venture Capitalists (VC’s) – individuals who invest third party funds in early stage 
startups (Greathouse, 2012). 
4. Relationship Risk - the risk that an entrepreneur may not make the same decisions when 
spending the investor’s money as the investor would (Maxwell, Jeffrey, & Lévesque, 
2011). 
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5. Agency Risk - the characteristics of the entrepreneur, principally where the interests of 
the entrepreneur and the investor diverged (Parhankangas & Hellström, 2007). 
6. Market Risk - the unknown market environment that could result in competitive 
challenges and whether or not market demand supported the growth of the startup venture 
(Parhankangas & Hellström, 2007). 
Chapter Overview 
 Chapter 1 provides an overview of the research by setting context for the need of 
frameworks to help guide entrepreneurs through myriad decisions that impact the successful or 
failed outcomes of their ventures.  It also clarified a gap between how entrepreneurs perceive risk 
differently than investors and it proposed the need for this gap to be closed.  The purpose of the 
study was presented in the Statement of the Problem, which was to determine if there is a 
common set of perceived critical risk factors among a group of experienced investors that could 
cause them to reject a deal out of hand.  The Significance of the Study suggests the utility for 
entrepreneurs, investors, and those who educate and mentor them.  The research questions were 
presented followed by the delimitations and limitations. 
 Chapter 2 is a review of the literature with respect to how entrepreneurs perceive risk, 
how investors evaluate risks in their decision making and delineating between the subjective and 
objective aspects of evaluating deals. 
 Chapter 3 provides a description of the Delphi Technique as well as presents the research 
questions, instrumentation, data collection and validity. 
 Chapter 4 presents the detailed analysis of the data. 
 Chapter 5 provides the findings and conclusions as well as recommendations for practice 
and future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The literature proved to be rich in the study of risk from both the perspective of 
entrepreneurs and that of investors.  A key purpose of this Literature Review was to set a context 
for these perspectives and highlight the key differences between them.  Much of the literature 
was based on understanding the observed decision processes of investors after the investment 
decisions had been made. Categorization of risk proved to be a popular topic among researchers 
and it is clear from this review of research that there are distinct differences in how entrepreneurs 
percieve and approach risk, and how investstors consider risk in their investment decisions.  
These differences are highlighted in five major sections of this chapter beginning with the 
entrepreneur perspective and moving toward the investor perspective.  This discussion leads to a 
consolidation of existing research into the categorization of risk to set a backdrop for the 
research of this dissertation and it ends with the relevance of risk as a topic of the entrepreneur’s 
presentation of the business opportunity to the investment community.  
 This chapter is presented in five sections to follow the flow mentioned above.  The first is 
Risk and the Entrepreneur.  It is a review of research into entrepreneurs and how they related to 
risk, uncertainty, and failure.  The second section is Investors and the Perception of Risk, where 
the investment process is introduced and how risk entered into the decision making of investors.  
The concept of investor-perceived risk is introduced and distinguished from how entrepreneurs 
perceive risk.  Organization of Risk reviews research into how subjective and even unconscious 
evaluations of risk fit into categories, which was useful in designing the research methodology 
for this study.  Relationship Risk reviews what may be the most powerful and challenging aspect 
of the study of risk in investment decision making; the power of the personal relationship.  The 
review of literature concludes with Once Upon a Time, a section of how all of this related to the 
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importance of conveying risk mitigation themes in the stories that entrepreneurs tell about their 
companies. 
Risk and the Entrepreneur 
The Entrepreneur 
To set a proper context for this study, a reference for the definition of entrepreneur was 
appropriate. Benjamin (2006) provided an excellent, albeit detailed, grounding.  He said 
entrepreneurship is,  
…a process of strategic thinking required to maintain an independent belief system that 
supports discovery, exploration and exploitation of wealth opportunities that destabilize 
prior market equilibria, demonstrating innovation, creativity and entrepreneurism to 
generate new flexible, adaptive and responsible market spaces that reward people ready, 
able and willing to meet emerging individual and societal needs, wants, hopes and 
expectations (p.6).   
Benjamin referred to Legge and Hindle (1997), who stated “Becoming an entrepreneur involves 
a conscious decision to create more value than you can capture personally; that no matter how 
well you do, the world at large will be even better off” (p.19).  Barrenger and Ireland (2016) 
defined entrepreneurship as “…the process by which individuals pursue opportunities without 
regard to resources they currently control for the purpose of exploiting future goods and services 
(p. 13).” 
A theme emerged from these definitions: entrepreneurship is a process, a conscious 
decision, a lifestyle, a skill, and it involves the desire to create value, usually without access to 
all the necessary resources.  Benjamin, in his effort to establish an integrated theory of 
entrepreneurship summarized it well by adding that entrepreneurs generally responded positively 
to both risk and opportunity (Benjamin, 2006).  Van Ness and Seifert (2016) used the term risk 
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in their definition; “entrepreneurs are defined as individuals who have risked or intend to risk 
their personal capital, personal time, and/or personal reputation in pursuit of business ventures” 
(p. 90).   
Defining Risk, Uncertainty, and Failure 
Mullins and Forlani (2005) defined risk as involving the likelihood and magnitude of 
outcomes falling below target.  The motivation for taking risk was the chance for gain but they 
defined risk more clearly as the likelihood of “realizing some magnitude of loss” (p.48).  Hirai 
(2010) added that risk is, “any situation where there is a possibility of an outcome that we would 
rather avoid” (p. 1).  
As researchers began to look into the concept of risk as it related to entrepreneurship, a 
distinction between risk and uncertainty developed.  Folta (2007) pointed out that risk can be 
quantified and therefore, be controlled, although controlling for risk may have an impact on 
innovation.  But the big problem with risk, as Folta defined it, is that risk is a quantifiable 
attribute based on predictions and probabilities from observed historical data and available 
information.  A common characteristic of entrepreneurship is that there is no history and 
therefore, no data from which to derive probabilities.  Schendel (2007) contended that the 
entrepreneur is not confronted with risk at all, but rather uncertainty.  Entrepreneurs must deal 
with high levels of ambiguity because in most cases there is no information available to 
adequately render probabilities and calculate risks, (Hmieleski & Baron, 2008).  
Uncertainty is at the heart of defining entrepreneurship and the personality characteristics 
of the entrepreneur.  While the technical distinctions between risk (quantifiable) and uncertainty 
(unquantifiable) are important, for the purpose of this dissertation, the word ‘risk’ was used to 
cover both concepts. 
A discussion of risk in the context of failure is appropriate here.  After all, it is the fear of 
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failure and loss that either impedes or drives the entrepreneurial process.  Entrepreneurs have 
been known to cite the fear of failure as one of the things that inspired their drive and drove their 
success (Morgan & Sisak, 2016). This idea was supported by Cacciotti, Hayton, Mitchell, and 
Giazitzoglu (2016), who studied the role fear played in entrepreneurial decision making.  Gulst 
(2011) provided a working definition for failure as “the entrepreneur’s dissatisfaction with the 
venture’s progression” (p. iii).  But Gulst also pointed out that entrepreneurs defined a failed 
business as one that failed to make a profit and essentially ran out of cash.  Another important 
aspect of failure was that it is such a great teacher.  Gulst studied this as did He (2014), who 
found that entrepreneurs, either by personality trait or by multiple cycles of failure, developed a 
high tolerance for uncertainty.  The willingness to risk failure provided entrepreneurs with 
opportunities for learning and personal growth and there was anecdotal evidence that investors 
preferred entrepreneurs who have had at least one catastrophic failure, as long as it was someone 
else’s money at stake (He, 2014).  Ucbasaran, Westhead, Wright, and Flores (2010) found that 
entrepreneurs who have experienced failure were less likely to be over optimistic about new 
opportunities, which may have a positive impact on the ability to get funding.  Gulst (2011) cited 
nine key causes of entrepreneurial failure that will become important later in the discussion of 
specific risk categories.  Those causes are management strategy, missing entrepreneurial 
characteristics, over-optimism and over-confidence, inexperience, lack of key partners, 
competence of key people, financial issues, unfocused market needs, and opportunity evaluation. 
Attitudes About Risk and Risk Tolerance 
 Risk tolerance is a character trait commonly associated with entrepreneurs.  Most formal 
definitions for entrepreneur included the assumption of risk.  He (2014) cited literature dating 
back to 1987 that put “risk taking” or “risk acceptance” (p. 20) at the top of most every listing of 
entrepreneur characteristics.  Palich and Bagby (1995) tackled this issue head-on by stating how 
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difficult it was to capture the relationship between risk-taking and other personality 
characteristics. They proposed an alternate theory based on research that showed that 
entrepreneurs were not necessarily predisposed toward risk more than anyone else. By applying 
cognitive theory, the difference came from the way entrepreneurs framed the opportunity for 
achieving positive outcomes.  
Baron (1998) advanced this concept by postulating cognitive conditions which can 
influence biases and errors when it comes to rational thought.  These conditions included 
information overload, a high degree of uncertainty, intense emotions, time pressures and 
decreased physical states.  These biases tended to push entrepreneurs into taking on opportunities 
that others would not.  Baron also pointed out that it was not so much the innate personality of 
entrepreneurs that brought on this condition as much as these conditions were an integral part of 
the entrepreneurial experience. 
 He (2014) wanted to understand the character traits of entrepreneurs compared to 
traditional company managers.  With regard to taking on risk, He concluded that entrepreneurs 
were risk tolerant but described their propensity for risk as “sensible” and “calculated” (p. 27).  
As for pure entrepreneurs who were not considered to be in leadership roles, risk taking ranked 
high.  For traditional leaders, risk taking ranked very low.  
Risk: An Entrepreneurial Characteristic 
Another key part of He’s (2014) research was to summarize entrepreneurial 
characteristics found in the literature as observed by a number of researchers.  Table 1 shows this 
summary.  It should be noted that some form of risk taking (identified in bold type) appears in all 
six of the lists. 
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Table 1 
A Summary of Entrepreneurial Characteristics  
Begley and Boyd (1987) Vecchio (2003) Perren (2002) Morris et al. (2008) 
Need for achievement  
Locus of control 
Risk taking 
propensity 
Tolerance of 
ambiguity  
Type A behavior 
 
Risk taking 
Need for achievement 
Need for autonomy 
Self-efficacy  
Locus of control 
Overconfidence/hubris 
 
 
Risk acceptance 
Innovation 
Personal drive 
Belief in control 
Ambiguity tolerance 
Need for 
independence 
Opportunity-seeking 
Intuitive 
Vision 
Self confidence 
Takes responsibility 
Resource marshalling 
Value adding 
Good networks 
Capacity to inspire 
Growth orientation 
Diligent 
Pro-activity 
Drive to achieve 
Internal locus of control 
Calculated risk taking 
Ambiguity tolerance 
Commitment/perseverance 
Independence 
Self confidence 
Tolerance for failure 
Problem solving 
Opportunity orientation 
Integrity and reliability 
High energy level 
Resourcefulness 
Creativity 
Team-building 
 
Carlund et al. (1996) Kao (1991) 
Risk taking 
Creativity/innovation 
Need for achievement 
Intuition 
Commitment 
Perseverance 
Desire to achieve 
Growth orientation 
Problem solving 
Realism 
Seeking feedback 
Locus of control 
Calculated risk taking 
Integrity and reliability 
Note. Bold type added for emphasis of risk-taking characteristic. Adapted from “The Perceived Personal 
Characteristics of Entrepreneurial Leaders” by L. He, 2014, Doctoral Dissertation, p. 20.   
 
Entrepreneurs and the Management of Risk 
 The review of literature, thus far, has established that the concepts risk tolerance, the 
ability to deal with ambiguity, and the overall world of uncertainty mark the reality of being an 
entrepreneur.  This is not to say that entrepreneurs go about navigating all this risk blindly.  
Entrepreneurs do, in fact, have ways of managing and controlling risk (Kuechle, Boulu-Reshef, 
& Carr, 2016).  Kuechle et al. (2016) found that in order to reduce uncertainty, entrepreneurs 
deployed two strategies, predictive and control based.  Predictive strategies are deployed when 
information is available (in agreement with the classic definition of risk), whereas control based 
strategies are used when there is more uncertainty.   
But the management of risk has a downside.  Folta (2007) found that as entrepreneurs 
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took measures to control risk, they may stifle the very innovation that made their venture a 
compelling opportunity.  Furthermore, they may take measures to control spending at a time 
when it could have a negative impact on future profits.  Burns, Barney, Angus, and Herrick 
(2016) researched how risk versus uncertainty impacted the way entrepreneurs sold their venture 
to potential stakeholders such as investors and key partners.  They found that under conditions of 
risk, entrepreneurs were better off to focus on the opportunity, while under conditions of 
uncertainty, enrolling stakeholders was based on attributes of the entrepreneur. 
Investors and the Perception of Risk 
The Game of Investing  
 There are two types of investors in startup companies that were the focus of this study.  
The first type is Angel Investors (Angels) who are wealthy individuals that invest in startup 
companies for a variety of reasons. They typically invest early in new ventures and have been 
successful entrepreneurs themselves (Wiltbank et al., 2009).  Angels play more in the uncertainty 
realm as they invest typically in unproven technologies in unverified markets (Murray& 
Marriott, 1998).  The Angel Capital Association (2016) noted there were over 300,000 Angels in 
the US who invested a total of $24 billion.  The average investment deal was $345,000 in over 
71,000 deals (Angel Capital Association 2016).   
The second type of investors is Venture Capitalists (VC) who manage a fund of other 
people’s money, which they invest in startups.  The Angel Capital Association compared Angel 
activity to VC activity in 2016.  That year, VC’s invested $59 billion in over 4,300 deals at an 
average of $13.6 million per deal.  There were over 700 active firms that year (Angel Capital 
Association, 2016).  Compared to Angels, the VC deals were much larger but far fewer.  VC’s 
tend to invest later in the growth stage of startup companies which is itself a risk mitigating 
factor. 
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Because of the inherent risk of investing in startups, the expected return among investors 
is between five and ten times the amount invested.  While statistics vary, the general notion was 
that out of 10 investments, three provided a significant return, four performed moderately, and 
the rest “evaporated” (Higgins, 2008).  
Decision Analysis 
 Korver (2012) stated “Failure may be the best teacher, but failure in early stage investing 
comes at a high cost” (para. 1).  In order to limit this cost, he implemented a framework used in 
pharmaceutical research and oil/gas exploration called Decision Analysis.  Korver acknowledged 
that the same cognitive biases that induced entrepreneurs to take risks could be detrimental in the 
face of uncertainty.  Simply put, investors saw risk quite differently than entrepreneurs did.  
Through Decision Analysis, Korver’s objective was to “marry the art with the science of 
decision-making through a disciplined process” (para. 11).   
 Payne (2011) proposed a more detailed method that mitigated risk through a process of 
valuation.  That is, assigning a monetary value to a startup based on comparing several 
categories to a known standard.  Not surprisingly, those categories included team, opportunity 
(market), product, competition, partnerships and financial. The categories were inclusive of those 
listed by Korver (2012) but the twist was that rather than probability, the categories were 
factored as a functional component of monetary value in the company.  Consequently, more 
risky companies carried less potential value.  Hirai (2010) introduced a quadrant framework for 
entrepreneurs and investors alike to evaluate startup risk objectively.  The quadrants included the 
categories of ignorable risk, nuisance risk, insurable risk and company killers.  It was the 
company killers that involved the most attention and they included market, competition, 
technology (product), financial, people (team), legal and systemic.   
 Korver (2012), Payne (2011), and Hirai (2010) all proposed evaluating risk according to 
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a nearly identical set of criteria. There is a consistency that emerged in how investors evaluate 
risk but when compared to the literature about how entrepreneurs view risk, the perspectives 
were divergent.   
Prediction, Control, and Trust 
 Wiltbank et al. (2009) studied investment outcomes of a number of Angels with regard to 
two different decision-making strategies.  Predictive strategies included extensive research of 
data regarding markets and trends.  Non-Predictive Control strategies included referring to 
acquaintances and leveraging personal experience with regard to the potential investment deal.  
The research found that those deploying control strategies tended to experience fewer failures 
than those using predictive strategies.  Those using predictive strategies tended to make larger 
investments, but there was no correlation to outcomes, which suggested that within the various 
frameworks investors used to evaluate and control risk, the best results were derived from the 
least technical approaches.  Investors were using categories, probabilities, and frameworks but 
they were also, to some extent, measuring with their gut, it seems. 
Enter: The Use of Heuristics  
 The literature reviewed thus far suggests that the evaluation of risk, both on the part of 
entrepreneurs and investors, was a conscious and deliberate system of defined processes and 
disciplines, with or without information, where probabilities were carefully considered and 
outcomes were predicted.  Many of the researchers suggested frameworks and best practices to 
implement a more structured approach to evaluating risk in the early stages of an investment 
deal.  But implementation of structured frameworks early in the process can be problematic, if 
for no other reason than sheer volume of deals.  In 2016, Angels completed over 71,000 deals 
(Angel Capital Association, 2016).  Harrison, Dibben, and Mason (1997) found that over the 
years up to 97% of entrepreneurial funding deals were rejected.  Paul, Whittam and Wyper, 
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(2007) noted that a typical investor looked at 10 or even 20 deals to do one.  An investment deal 
took anywhere from three to 18 months to close.  The problem is not one of strategy or process.  
It is purely one of time management and focused attention. There are models that suggest how 
investors can weigh and score potential deals, but typically, they used cognitive short cuts, or 
heuristics to reduce the total number of potential deals down to a manageable level (Maxwell, 
Jeffrey, & Lévesque, 2011).  They outlined two stages early in the decision process: selection 
and post selection.  At both stages, investors were looking for a fatal flaw that would kill the deal 
early and quickly.  The use of heuristics was common in decision making.  Maxwell et al. (2011) 
found the use of heuristics was generally accurate, although they warned that deviation from 
actual frequency can occur as exemplified by the fact that most people believe they are more 
likely to die in a plane crash than they are in an automobile accident (Barrabi, 2014; Maxwell et 
al., 2011).  They summarized the concept by noting that some accuracy may be sacrificed for 
expediency.  These researchers also acknowledged that investors tended to use heuristics, but 
they often developed them subconsciously.  Despite that, Maxwell et al. (2011) found eight 
distinct categories or decision criteria relative to this use of heuristics: 
1. Market Potential – measured in terms of market size 
2. Product Adoption – the extent to which markets had been penetrated.  Commonly 
known as market share 
3. Protectability – intellectual property such as patents and trademarks 
4. Entrepreneur Experience – reputation and record of past entrepreneurial experiences 
5. Product Status – referring to the stage of product development 
6. Route to Market – sometimes known as a go-to-market strategy, or how the product 
will be found by the customer 
7. Customer Engagement – validation that customers will in fact, buy the product 
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8. Financial Projections – timeline to cash flow of the business and future profitability 
In subsequent research the same team determined that Angels tended to aggregate their 
perceptions of these eight categories into levels of risk and return (Jeffrey, Lévesque, & 
Maxwell, 2016).  If the perceived risk was too high or the anticipated rate of return was too low 
for any of the eight categories, it was considered a fatal flaw and the deal was rejected early 
without any further cognitive effort.  The risk and return formed thresholds that allowed even 
quicker rejection of opportunities that held little promise.   
The Stages of Investment – The Concept of Timing 
 Maxwell, Jeffrey, and Lévesque (2011) suggested two distinct stages where the use of 
heuristics was more likely to influence decisions: the selection and post-selection stages.  A 
closer look into these stages formed a better understanding of the timing.  Three stages were 
identified by Amatucci and Sohl (2004), which were the pre-investment stage, contract 
negotiation, and the post-investment stage.  The screening process normally took place in the 
pre-investment stage and led to due diligence.  The investment stage involved the term sheet and 
negotiations while the post-investment stage involved future funding and eventual exits.  
Building on this work, Paul et al. (2007) identified five stages summarized in Figure 1. 
Paul et al. (2007) indicated that relationships were forming at the Familiarization Stage, 
which was where the much of the subjective decision-making took place.  The process slowly 
became more formal as the deal progressed into the Screening Stage.  By the time the deal 
progressed to the Bargaining Stage, the process was largely driven by contracts and negotiations. 
However, Paul et al. (2007) warned that the process was in no way orderly.   
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Figure 1. A model of the angel investment process.  Adapted from “Towards a model of the 
business angel investment process,” by S. Paul, G. Whittam, and J. Wyper, 2007,  Venutre 
Capital (9) 2, p. 114.  
 
Relationship queues could become a factor at any point in the process.  They also drew a 
distinction between Angels and VC’s noting that Angels were more reliant on relationship to 
hedge risk in those early stages. Cox, Lortie and Gramm (2017) echoed the point by adding that 
Angels tended to make decisions based on an “array” of non-financial factors more so than VC’s.  
Carpentier and Suret (2015) found a similar model at play when analyzing the decision-making 
process of Angel Investment Groups, which are formally organized groups of Angels who work 
together to review and syndicate deals.  Angel Investment Groups tended to have a primary 
organizer or manager who served as gatekeeper and performed administrative and due diligence 
activities.  The following is a summary of that process (Carpentier & Suret, 2015): 
 Step 1 – Prescreen – the gatekeeper assesses each opportunity and typically rejected 
up to 68% of proposals based on criteria such as location, industry, development 
stage and size of the investment.  These hardly even qualify as subjective but 
heuristics are definitely in play. 
   Learning about opportunity Meeting the Entrepreneur  
Deal  
structure 
Agreement 
Familiarization Stage Screening Stage Bargaining Stage 
Initial 
screen 
Detailed 
screen 
Managing Stage Harvesting Stage 
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 Step 2 – Initial screening – the gatekeeper, along with a small group of Angels review 
the opportunity for fit within the group and to determine if the entrepreneur will be 
invited to pitch to the group.  Thirteen percent of the proposals are retained at this 
point.  Survival at this stage involved the subjective opinions of this small group. 
 Step 3 – Presentation to the group – short (10 minute) presentations were made at 
monthly meetings.  Only 11% survived this round and it involved recruiting 3 or 4 
Angels to lead the project. 
 Step 4 – The hour-long presentation – where only 3 were rejected leaving 10% 
survivors. 
 Step 5 – Detailed analysis – This is where the formal objective decision making 
began.  It includes document and financial reviews and a series of meetings.  Prior to 
step 5, the majority of decisions moving entrepreneurs forward relied mostly on 
opinions and subjectivity.  This step jettisoned more until only 4% were left and these 
were offered term sheets and started negotiations. 
This process presented above highlighted a fairly arduous journey for the entrepreneur 
and it also reinforced how few deals were offered to the population of those seeking funding.  In 
this study, 637 entrepreneurs started but only 26 (4%) recieved deal offers.  Only until Stage 5 
did objective decision-making criteria come into play.  The mean amount of time to close these 
deals from start to finish was 4.5 months (Carpentier & Suret, 2015). 
The Organization of Risk 
The Early Development of Categories 
 Entrepreneurs and investors have somewhat differing perspectives of risk.  Furthermore, 
it has been noted that investors tended to use subjective shortcuts or heuristics to wade through 
the sheer volume of potential early stage opportunities to get to those that possess the most fit, 
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interest and potential for a return.  This section focuses on the research into how the concept of 
risk was segmented and organized into categories. 
 Parhankangas and Hellström (2007) identified two broad category headers; Agency and 
Market risks.  Agency risk referred to the characteristics of the entrepreneur, principally where 
the interests of the entrepreneur and the investor diverged.  Market risk referred to the unknown 
market environment that could result in competitive challenges and whether or not market 
demand supported the growth of the startup venture.  Within these two broad categories, they 
identified a number of characteristics that were rated as perceptions on the part of investors in 
rejecting deals.  These can be seen in Table 2 (Parhankangas & Hellström (2007): 
Table 2 
Risk Perceptions from Angels Who Reject Deals 
Agency Risks Market Risks 
Dishonest Entrepreneurs 
Different cash flow objectives 
Contractual ambiguities 
Different profitability objectives 
Different growth objectives 
Short-term interest on the part of the 
entrepreneur 
Unattractive industry 
Weak customer demand 
Too few buyers 
Readily substitutable competitive 
products 
Technical obsolescence 
Entrepreneurs not performing their 
responsibilities 
Manipulation of financial information 
 
Note: Adapted from “How experience and perceptions shape risky behaviour: Evidence from the 
venture capital industry,” by A. Parhankangas and T. Hellström, 2007, Venture Capital (9) 3, p. 
195. 
 
 The balance of Parhankangas and Hellström’s research (2007) centered on risk reduction 
strategies observed from the investors.  They found four strategies: syndication, whereby 
investors spread risk among a portfolio of companies; monitoring of the entrepreneur’s activities 
through regular contact and reporting; information seeking in the form of detailed research; and 
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the use of preferred stock which give preferential rights to the investors at the time of liquidation 
(exit sale or initial public offering of stock.). 
 Miloud, Aspelund, and Cabrol (2012) studied the investment process of VC’s from 
origination of the deal to the exit of the investment.  The process was well defined and it was 
centered on determining a value of the company, which determined how much equity ownership 
was required of the company founders in return for the investment.  While the investment 
process was fairly detailed, valuation at the early stages was quite difficult because the valuation 
algorithms were based on the present value of future cash flows, which were trended from 
current cash flows.  Since there are no cash flows with a startup, valuation was determined by 
resorting to best guesses (Miloud et al., 2012).   Rather than straight out “pure guesses”, Miloud 
et al. (2012) saw how investors focused on inputs such as those listed below: 
Industry organization – this was a focus on how the startup’s product was differentiated 
from the other competitors in the market.  Also important was an evaluation of how the 
market is projected to grow in the future. 
Entrepreneurial resources – evaluated by the experience of the entrepreneur.  Categories 
of experience included technical experience with the product development, industry 
experience, experience as a key employee and experience with other startup companies. 
Top management team – experience and completeness of the founding team and key 
management team with regard to market, industry, startups, finance, etc. 
External ties and startup valuation – relationships with existing and potential partners.  
Also evaluated were other relationships with investors, industry stakeholders and industry 
connections.  
Later Developments in Risk Categorization 
Streletzki, and Schulte (2013) attempted to link VC selection criteria with new venture 
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growth and returns at exit.  They identified five major groupings of selection criteria as follows: 
Founder team – experience in industry and with other startups.  Also evaluated was the 
network of the founding team 
Company – criteria included four main topics: development stage of the product, location 
of the startup with a preference on being geographically close, whether the company is a 
spin-off of a university or corporation, and existing partnerships. 
Product – criteria included patent protection, proof-of-concept (functional prototype), and 
diversity relative to the number of products available to sell. 
Market – included market segments (with a preference on business-to-consumer) and 
strategy regarding existing markets versus new markets.  
Financial Criteria – projections and valuation 
Cox et al. (2017) took the work of Maxwell et al. (2011) and reorganized it into four 
main criteria categories: internal, external, fit, and technology.  Internal criteria were related to 
the management team while external criteria related to market characteristics.  Technology 
criteria were rather obvious, but the risk criteria added to the conversation was that of fit; 
specifically, two elements: industry fit and entrepreneur fit.  Industry fit had to do with the 
investor’s familiarity and expertise in the industry of the venture, and entrepreneur fit had to do 
with whether or not the investor believed the entrepreneur had to proper experience to operate in 
the industry.  This point came up again in the discussion of relationship risk. 
Quality of the Leadership Team 
 Much of the cited research regarding risk criteria was observed post-deal and identified 
after the fact.  In some cases attempts were made to quantify these risks to see which were given 
more emphasis in the decision making process.  It stood to reason that researchers turned their 
attention specifically to this quantification problem in order to find what the most important risk 
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criteria were.  The answer is that it depends, but anectdotally, the number one concern among 
risk criteria for investors has been the management team.  One anecdote that persists to this day 
goes like this: “investors would rather invest in an ‘A’ team with a ‘B’ technology, than an ‘A’ 
technology with a ‘B’ team.”  Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, and Henkel (2008) determined that 
criteria related to the management team rated consistently in the top three categories.  They were 
also able to trace a possible origin of the above anecdote to Bygrave (1997).  Matusik, George 
and Heely (2008) echoed this sentiment that the quality of the leadership team was a key 
characteristic.  Franke et al. (2008) developed a hierarchy of management team characteristics.  
They were in order of rating; industry experience, field of education, university degree, 
leadership experience, mutual acquaintance, age of team members, and prior experience.  In a 
more recent study, Drover, Wood, and Zacharakis (2017) distilled these criteria down to the 
common “big four”: 1. Management team, 2. Market, 3. Offering (technology or product), and 4. 
Financial potential.   
 Toft-Kehler, Wennberg, and Kim (2014) found a “non-linear” relationship between the 
experience of the team and ultimate financial performance of the venture.  Their argument was 
that experienced entrepreneurs actually did worse because their experience created “barriers to 
learning,” especially those who had one success before starting the next venture.  They posited 
that entrepreneurship can be learned-by-doing but it takes several experiences to build the 
instincts necessary for success.  Apparently, practice (and some good old failure) does make 
perfect (or at least better performing startups).  Toft-Mehler et al. also concluded that with the 
use of heuristics and experience, perceptions did not always equal reality. 
Relationship Risk 
 At the outset of this review of literature, it was established that investors tended to use 
heuristics and subjective influences in their decision-making process in the early stages of an 
  36 
investment deal. From the work of these researchers, there may be categories that could provide 
a framework for entrepreneurs to think about how they should approach investors. Some 
categories, like market size and sales projections, could be addressed objectively (with numbers) 
so as to reduce perceived uncertainty. However, the review of literature revealed a risk category 
that is firmly planted in the realm of subjectivity and uncertainty and it could possibly trump all 
risk criteria within a moment.  That criterion is Relationship Risk. 
Failure in the First Meeting: Building or Damaging Trust 
 Maxwell et al. (2011) postulated that an entrepreneur’s behavior during an initial meeting 
with an investor could either build or damage trust, which determined the likelihood of receiving 
an investment offer.  A new risk category was introduced, “relationship risk,” which was defined 
as the risk that an entrepreneur may not make the same decisions when spending the investor’s 
money as the investor would.  Relationship risk introduced the concept of ‘moral hazard’.  The 
conclusions were that during initial meetings between investors and entrepreneurs, investors 
tended to “intuitively audit” positive and negative behaviors related to trust as a way of 
determining relationship risk prior to offering an investment.  Put succinctly, they had to like 
you.   
 The impact of trust did not end with the first meeting.  Bammens and Collewaert (2014) 
built on the work of Maxwell and Levesque and others to determine how trust impacted the 
investor’s perception of company performance.  Trust, it seemed, could be a two-edged sword in 
a relationship.  Trust led to better communication, which led to improved performance as seen by 
the investor.  But the downside was that an emphasis on maintaining trust could lock the players 
into patterns of expected behavior, which may not be sustainable in a dynamic business 
environment.  In 2014, Maxwell and Lévesque looked into this aspect of trustworthiness.  They 
found that in the initital meeting with an investor, entrepreneurs who conveyed a set of trust-
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building behaviors were extend more offers than those who displayed turst-damaging behaviors.  
Furthermore, trust damaging and trust violating behaviors, even though they were unintentional, 
were present when the entrepreneur failed to receive an offer, regardless of how well the 
entreprenuer lined up with the rest of the critical factors discussed (Maxwell & Lévesque, 2014).  
This all refers back to how investors attempt to control for risk. Maxwell and Lévesque (2014) 
pointed out that relationship was one of those control strategies and perhaps one of the most 
powerful. Should the entrepreneur display a behavior that damaged or violated trust, they were in 
for further control mechanisms if not a flat out rejection.  The research team was able to identify 
specific trust damaging and violating behaviors while directly observing entrepreneurs engaged 
with investors in the deal making process.  These behaviors are provided and ranked in order of 
occurance in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Summary of Relationship Risk Factors 
Ranked list of Relationship Risk Factors 
1. Competence 
2. Accuracy 
3. Explanation 
4. Openness 
5. Consistency 
6. Judgement 
7. Alignment 
8. Receptiveness 
9. Benevolence 
10. Disclosure 
11. Reliance 
 
Note: Adapted from “Trustworthiness: A critical ingredient for entrepreneurs seeking investors,” 
by A. Maxwell and M. Lévesque, 2014, Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice (38) 5, p. 1069. 
 
Drover, Wood, and Payne (2014) built upon the concept.  They were studying elements 
of agency risk and how investors sought to control for it.  They pointed out that entrepreneurs 
preferred to maintain autonomy in decision making and had to be prepared to relinquish some of 
it when they took other people’s money.  This set up the potential for conflict, which as Maxwell 
and Lévesque (2014) pointed out, could be attenuated through building trust. Drover et al. (2014) 
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introduced three primary drivers in relationship building: entrepreneurial prestige, opportunity 
attractiveness, and control.  They underscored the fact that these drivers were primarily 
subjective perceptions and they concluded that entrepreneurs were most likely to receive an offer 
when these subjective ratings are high. 
The Double-Sided Moral Hazard 
 Fairchild (2011) extended the trust relationship in the other direction by concluding that 
trust played a role in the entrepreneur’s decision to choose a funding partner.  VC’s generally 
provided higher level resources and value than Angels.  They had access to better networks and 
more administrative support.  But some entrepreneurs opted for the empathy and trust that may 
be more obvious with Angels.  Fairchild suggested that entrepreneurs be aware of this their 
decision-making to better balance between relational aspect and higher value creating potential. 
Telling the Company Story 
 It was clear from the research literature that entrepreneurs viewed risk differently from 
investors.  Furthermore, investors used a combination of methods, both objective and subjective, 
to quantify risk in their decision-making process, even down to the level of evaluating 
relationship risk.  Maxwell and Levesque (2011) determined that even the first impression in the 
initial meeting could make the difference.  This brought the discussion to communication.  If an 
entrepreneur had one shot to convey a message of managed risk to an investor who evaluated the 
business and the behavior, then the story had better be good.  
 There are a number of resources to assist entrepreneurs in making better presentations, 
from slide design to presentation techniques, but there is nothing in the mainstream literature that 
treats the entrepreneur’s story as a narrative. Gartner (2007) claimed that narrative approaches 
could provide a powerful set of tools to understand what entrepreneurs say about themselves and 
their ventures.  This work focused more on how to study entrepreneurs themselves rather than 
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how entrepreneurs use narrative for their own purposes but the essential findings could apply.  
Gartner pointed out that “story construction is a process of creating reality” (p. 615), which was 
at the heart of what an entrepreneur hoped to accomplish in attracting venture capital.  He put it 
all in context: “The narrative of entrepreneurship is the generation of hypotheses about how the 
world might be: how the future might look and act” (p. 614).  
Conclusion 
 The research literature suggests that entrepreneurs and investors place importance on the 
mitigation and management of risk and uncertainty.  But the literature is also clear that 
entrepreneurs and investors evaluate risk from divergent perspectives.  Investors are exposed to 
hundreds of potential deals over a year’s time and in order to wade through the sheer volume and 
reduce the noise, they tend to use heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to identify which deals to 
disregard quickly and which to pursue.  Research in this area has focused largely on outcomes, or 
the back end of the investment process showing that there are categories of risk factors that may 
result in a deal failing to go forward.  Other research introduced the concept of relationship risk, 
which is even more subjective than arbitrary judgements about financial and market 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Introduction 
  The research methodology chosen for this dissertation was the Delphi Method, Delphi 
Technique, or simply Delphi.  The method was developed in the 1950’s by Norman Dalkey, who 
worked for the Rand Corporation (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007).  The application was a 
military project in which Dalkey was developing a way to estimate or predict the number of 
atomic weapons needed to achieve a certain outcome (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963).  It was designed 
as a group communication tool used to achieve convergence of opinion among a group of experts 
(Hsu & Sandford, 2007).  The technique itself has been researched for its fitness as a research 
tool over the years and, despite some challenges, it has emerged as a fit and useful technique. 
Delbecq, Van de Ven, and Gustafson (1975) determined that Delphi was particularly useful in 
the following applications: 
1. To determine or develop a range of possible program alternatives, 
2. To explore or expose underlying assumptions or information leading to different 
judgments, 
3. To seek out information which may generate a consensus on the part of the 
respondent group, 
4. To correlate informed judgments on a topic spanning a wide range of disciplines, and 
5. To educate the respondent group as to the diverse and interrelated aspects of the topic 
(p. 11). 
The Delphi Method was chosen as a research methodology for this dissertation.  The 
applications highlighted above fit well with the purpose and scope for this research. 
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Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this Delphi study was to determine if there is a common set of perceived 
critical risk factors among a group of experienced investors that could cause them to reject a deal 
out of hand.  The Delphi method was appropriate for this study because the information was 
uncertain, difficult to quantify, and subject to opinion (Hsu & Standford, 2007; Murray, 1979).  
Choosing Delphi satisfied at least three of the five applications presented by Delbecq et al. 
(1975).  Knowledge, opinions, and speculation all provided value to the research and Delphi is 
particularly well suited as a research methodology (Dalkey, 1969). 
Research Questions 
1. To what extent are critical risk factors are involved in the decision-making process of 
investors in considering a deal? 
2. Which critical risk factors (execution, market, technological, financial, regulatory, etc.) 
do investors consider to be common among most investment decisions? 
3. Of these most common categories, what is the relative weight of importance among 
them? 
4. What differences occur among the critical risk factors between Angel investors and 
Venture Capitalists? 
The Delphi Method 
Delphi can be used to quantify subjective judgements from a group of experts on a 
collective basis in a way that cannot be done through the use of precise analytical techniques 
(Alder & Ziglio, 1996).  Four key features that define the essence of Delphi were offered by 
Rowe and Wright (1999): 
1. Anonymity of participants – allowed the participants to exercise opinions free of any 
social pressures of conformity, 
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2. Iteration – the participants were allowed to refine their perspectives in view of the 
group’s overall consensus as the different rounds continue, 
3. Controlled Feedback – Each participant was given feedback on how their responses 
measure against the median responses of the group, giving them the opportunity to 
modify their stances on the topics, and 
4. Statistical aggregation of the responses – allowed for quantitative analysis and data 
interpretation. 
Linstone and Turoff (1975) presented evidence of the flexibility of the method and its 
ability to adapt to the specific needs of the study at hand.  Skulmoski et al. (2007) presented a 
number of formal studies that used Delphi research techniques to identify, validate, and forecast 
a range of research interests, most notably in Information Systems where critical projects needed 
to be ranked in order of importance and risk. Dalkey (1969) clarified the use of Delphi in 
decision making involving assertions that come from knowledge of a group of individuals, 
opinions, which have some basis in belief but fell short of knowledge, and finally speculation, 
which had little or no backing from evidence.  Dalkey concluded that although the lines between 
these three forms of input are rather blurry, opinion and speculation did have value. Murray 
(1979) recommend, in a detailed critique of Delphi, that the technique was well suited in 
researching areas of high uncertainty, where more traditional analytical methods did not apply, 
such as the area involving opinion.   
The Structure of the Delphi Method 
  A typical Delphi study could be thought of as consisting of three phases: brainstorming, 
consolidation, and ranking (Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).  During the brainstorming phase, 
relevant factors are gathered.  In the consolidation phase, the long list of factors is analyzed for 
duplication and relevance, and the list is pared down.  In the ranking phase, the items in the list 
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are rated on a number of criteria that could include importance, relevance, risk, or likelihood.  
The process essentially involves a series of questionnaires beginning with an open-ended broad 
question (the Delphi Question) and continues through subsequent rounds of surveys until a 
consensus is reached among the panel of experts (Delbecq et al., 1975).  The earliest Delphi 
studies used five rounds of surveys (Dalkey & Helmer, 1963), and some Delphi studies can be 
accomplished with as few as two rounds (Thangaratinam & Redman, 2005).  However, there 
seems to be some consensus that three rounds are usually sufficient (Brooks, 1979; Cyphert & 
Gant, 1971; Ludwig, 1997). 
  Hsu and Sandford (2007) provided a suitable description of the various rounds of 
surveys.  Round 1 was typically a questionnaire with one or more open ended questions.  In the 
analysis phase of Round 1, responses were gathered, consolidated, complied in aggregate, and 
summarized.  From this exercise, the questionnaire for Round 2 was developed.  In Round 2, 
participants were provided the information from Round 1 and asked to rank or otherwise rate the 
items.  Respondents were given the opportunity to provide written rationale for their choices.  In 
Round 3, participants were given the median rankings from Round 2, along with their own 
personal responses.  They were given the opportunity to revise their ratings or keep their position 
outside the consensus. Based on the work of Hsu and Sandford (2007) the design methodology 
for this dissertation consisted of a three-round survey process in which critical risk factors are 
identified by participants using open ended questions in Round 1, weighting each critical risk 
factor on a 5-point Likert scale for Importance and a 3-point Likert Scale for Frequency in 
Round 2, and allowing for a revised weighting based on group comparisons in Round 3. 
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Sampling  
Sample Size 
  The actual number of participants in a Delphi study is a subject still in need of consensus 
among the research literature (Hsu & Standford, 2007).  Delbecq et al. (1975) recommend using 
a minimal number while Ludwig (1997) found that most Delphi studies used between 15 and 20 
participants.  Dalkey and Helmer (1963) used as few as seven and in early studies on the method. 
Dalkey, Rourke, Lewis, and Snyder (1972) reported a dramatic decrease in error as group size 
increased past 15, and also a steady increase in reliability as group size increased past 11.  In 
early experiments, they reported a correlation coefficient approaching 0.9 with a group of 13 
respondents (Dalkey et al., 1972).  Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) targeted between 10 and 18 
participants for their studies.  Baker, Lovell, and Harris (2006) offered that Delphi samples 
should be less than 20.  Based on these ranges the sample size chosen for this project was 20 
participants, allowing for potential attrition of up to 5 participants.  Twenty participants were 
recruited to begin the study and 18 ended up completing the process. 
Choice of Participants 
  Fundamental to the reliability of a Delphi study is the choice of experts (Baker et al., 
2006).  Baker et al. (2006) suggested three themes in defining an expert: knowledge based on 
professional qualifications, experience based on length of time, and ability to influence policy 
(make independent decisions).  Characteristics and qualifications of desirable panelists should be 
identified and used to recruit and select the panel participants (Ludwig, 1997).  The fundamental 
criteria used to define experts for this study included the following: 
 Primary decision-making authority 
 Minimum of 10 investments over 5 years 
 At least one positive net return 
  45 
These criteria were tested and validated by a pilot group of Angel Investors, Venture 
Capitalists, and entrepreneurship faculty at the University of Tennessee.   
Recruitment and Onboarding 
A list of 25 potential participants was created through personal networks of the researcher 
and faculty in the University of Tennessee, the Director of the Knoxville Entrepreneurship 
Center, and Directors of the Angel Capital Group of Knoxville, TN and the Angel Roundtable of 
Johnson City, TN.  The sample was recruited within a geographical radius of 350 miles centered 
about Knoxville, Tennessee including Northeast Tennessee, Knoxville, Chattanooga, Nashville, 
Atlanta, London (KY) and Cincinnati. This region contains the typical population of investors 
available to most startups in the region. Diversity was a factor in selecting the sample in terms of 
Venture Capitalists, Angels, and Angel Groups. 
Each candidate was contacted individually, either in person or through a phone call where 
the purpose, scope, and mechanics of the study were explained.  The researcher also explained to 
each candidate that their participation was to be voluntary, their identity and participation in the 
project were confidential, and their identities would be known only to the researcher.  
Once each participant verbally agreed, a follow-up email was sent formally inviting them 
to participate in the study with a request to reply with their confirmation of willingness to be a 
part of the expert panel.  Upon beginning the survey in Round 1, the conclusion of the Statement 
of Informed Consent required a positive response to the following set of conditions: 
“Clicking the “agree button” below indicates 
 I have read the above information 
 I agree to volunteer 
 I am at least 18 years old 
 NOTE: Agreeing to this Informed Consent applies to this and the two subsequent 
surveys in the study” 
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Instrumentation 
There are four essential features of Delphi: anonymity of participants, iteration, 
controlled feedback, and statistical aggregation of results (Rowe & Wright 1999).  An online 
survey software application provided utility for the first three.  Each participant was invited to 
sign in online for each of three rounds of surveys (iteration).  Only the researcher knew the 
identities of the respondents (anonymity) and the construction of the surveys provided the 
controlled feedback.  All the resulting raw data were stored in the Cloud within the online survey 
application.  Statistical aggregation of the results was performed using Microsoft Excel, which 
proved sufficient for the task. 
The overview provided by Skulmoski et al. (2007) provided a graphic representation of 
the process used to design the surveys as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Typical Delphi Process.  Adapted from “The Delphi Method for Graduate Research” 
by developed by G. Skulmoski, F. Hartman, & J. Krahn, 2007, Journal of Information 
Technology Education, 6, p. 3. 
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Survey 1 
Survey 1 included some basic demographic information relative to the participant’s 
investment profile, location, and experience.  Basic instructions were given regarding how to 
complete the survey questions.  The survey opened up with the following request (Delphi 
Question): 
“Please list all the critical risk factors you look for when evaluating a potential 
investment deal.  To the extent you can, or are willing, please include a measurable 
quantifier.” 
 
A pilot study was performed upon the completion of the design of Survey 1 in order to 
test the survey application for utility and clarity.  The pilot group consisted of entrepreneurship 
faculty at the Haslam College of Business at the University of Tennessee.  A full copy of Survey 
1 can be found in Appendix A. 
Survey 2 
 Survey 2 was derived from the results of Survey 1.  The following instructions were 
given to the participants: 
“For your convenience, the critical risk factors have been arranged in categories.  As you 
prepare for this survey, please keep these things in mind:  
 Consider and rate the factors you commonly use early in the investment process, 
during the time prior to due diligence, when you are forming 
relationships.  These should be things that come up during presentations, 
conversations and early meetings.  
 Go with your immediate first reaction.  Do not try to over-analyze a factor. Your 
first impression is usually indicative of your judgement. 
 This list far exceeds the total number of any individual's responses.  If you see a 
response you did not mention in Survey #1 but would like to rate it, please do so. 
 But, do not feel you have to rate every response as important.” 
During the analysis of results from Survey 1, concern developed due to the sheer number 
of critical risk factors.  The concern was whether the participants would be able to differentiate 
the importance of each critical risk factor enough for a suitable ranking to be possible.  An 
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alternative strategy was developed to provide more diversity among the responses in case this 
concern materialized.  The alternative strategy was to include a 3-point Likert rating of 
“Frequency of Use” in addition the 5-point Likert rating of “Importance”.  The following are the 
instructions given to the participants: 
“Each of the following pages contains a list of critical factors organized by overall 
category.  For each critical factor, there are two rating scales; one for importance and the 
other for frequency of use. 
 
The following definitions correspond to each point of the importance scale:  
 Not Important - This factor is not considered early in the process 
 Minimally Important - This factor is worth mentioning 
 Moderately Important - This factor is considered based on circumstances 
 Important - This factor is usually considered for most cases 
 Critically Important - This factor is a sudden death deal breaker 
The Frequency of Use scale is pretty self-explanatory:  
 Never - I never consider this factor 
 Occasionally - I use this factor from time to time 
 Always - I never make a decision without considering this factor 
 
Other instructions:  
1. Only rate those factors common to your thought process, rate the rest "Not 
Important".  Any skipped questions will be considered "Not Important". 
2. You may move back and forth between pages. 
3. At the end of the critical risk factors, there is a page for you to list any others you feel 
were left out or came to mind during the survey.  
4. The very last page of the survey asks you if you are ready to complete the survey.  If 
so, then the results will be record.  Up until that time, you may leave and come back 
later.” 
A complete copy of Survey 2 can be found in Appendix A, which shows the layout of 
each critical risk factor, along with the Importance rating and the Frequency of Use rating. 
Survey 3 
 The results from Round 2 were compiled and a statistical analysis was performed, 
consisting of calculating the mean, median and standard deviation for each critical factor.  The 
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results from the Importance ratings were compared to the results of the combined ratings of 
Importance and Frequency of Use.  Two conclusions were drawn.  First, there proved to be 
significant diversity among the data of the Importance ratings.  Second, the addition of the 
Frequency of Use data provided no significant difference over the results of the Importance 
ratings alone.  The decision was made to proceed to Survey 3 using only the Importance data.   
The Qualtrics survey application provided a utility that cross referenced each 
participant’s responses from Survey 2 into the questions for Survey 3.  For each critical risk 
factor from Survey 2, the participants were able to see the median score for the critical risk 
factor, the range of ratings from the group, and their personal rating, followed by a field in which 
they could alter their original ranking if they chose to do so. A copy of Survey 3 is included in 
Appendix A showing the layout of each critical risk factor.  The following are the instructions 
for Survey 3: 
“Each of the following pages contains a list of critical risk factors organized by overall 
category.  For each critical risk factor, you will see the median score, the range of scores of 
the group, and your score highlighted in Bold Text. 
 
The space in the column on the right is where you may change or alter your score for that 
critical risk factor.  If you do not wish to change your score, simply leave the space blank. 
 
Other instructions:  
1. If Your Score: 0, it means you did not enter a response for that question in Survey 
#2.  You may still rate the factor based on your reaction to the group; or you may 
leave it blank as well. 
2. You may move back and forth between pages. 
3. The very last page of the survey asks you if you are ready to complete the survey.  If 
so, then the results will be recorded.  Up until that time, you may leave and come 
back later.” 
Reliability and Validity 
  Hill and Fowles (1975) pointed out that one of the strengths of Delphi was also a 
weakness with regard to reliability.  That is the fact that Delphi is a flexible approach which 
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excludes the method from standardized procedures.  Bearing in mind that this particular critique 
was contextual to the use of using Delphi as a forecasting tool, much of the reliability claims 
dealt with the accuracy of said predictions.  Nonetheless, Hill and Fowles (1975) provided 
discussion on how to improve the reliability of Delphi methods; principally in two main areas.  
First, design of the questionnaire.  If wording was ambiguous, it could be interpreted differently 
by different participants.  The second area was in the choice of the participants.  Delphi assumes 
the participant panel was carefully chosen based on relevant criteria over the researcher’s 
familiarity with the individuals. However, when the topic turned to validity, Hill and Fowles 
(1975) were even less enthusiastic as they questioned the “best guess” approach of the method. 
  Woundenberg (1991) presented a more positive opinion of the accuracy of Delphi by 
citing a number of experiments that proved forecasting accuracy improved through the iterative 
process of multiple rounds and the anonymity of responses.  Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) pushed 
back even harder when they stated that reliability between tests is not relevant because the 
participants are expected to revise their answers.  In addressing validity of the process, they 
pointed out that Delphi has improved like any other survey method through careful design of the 
questions, but they added that the process was self-correcting in that the participants validated 
the researcher’s interpretations of the variables. 
  Baker et al. (2006) summarized the issue of reliability by stating that the use of experts 
was fundamental to improving reliability and presented a framework for choosing an expert 
panel. Landeta (2006) summared the validity of Delphi by suggesting that since the rise in 
popularity in the 1980s, the novelty of Delphi had worn off and became accepted by the 
scientific community as a valid research technique. 
  Based on the research discussed above, the following steps were taken to maximize the 
reliability and validity of this Delphi based dissertation: 
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 Careful selection of the expert panel – Criteria were developed by consulting with a 
pilot group of Venture Capitalists, Angel Investors and Entrepreneurship Faculty 
from the University of Tennessee to ensure the panelists had sufficient experience and 
expertise on the research topic. 
 Careful consideration of the questionnaires though simplification, review, and 
piloting with the same pilot group mentioned above. 
 Anonymity – All the surveys were conducted with anonymity among the participants.  
This protected against any undue influence of personality and allowed the participants 
to evaluate their responses independently of peer group pressure to conform. 
 Iteration – Through three rounds, consensus was achieved over a core set of critical 
factors. 
 Statistical aggregation – responses, albeit subjective, were quantified and analyzed 
statistically. 
 Use of online survey tools to maximize the experience and to ensure privacy.  
Data Collection 
 This study was performed using a series of three surveys, all conveyed and recorded in an 
online based survey application called Qualtrics.  Online links to the surveys were each 
distributed via email to the participants described in the Sampling section above.  
 In Survey 1, an open-ended question was asked and the responses were collected in the 
survey tool in a series of critical risk factors relevant to the process of making investment 
decisions.  In the analysis phase of Survey 1 the responses were reviewed, duplicates were 
removed and a total aggregate list of all critical risk factors was configured in categories grouped 
for similarity and convenience for the participants in Survey 2.   
 In Survey 2, the list of critical risk factors was distributed to the same participants, who 
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were asked to rate each factor on a 5-point Likert scale for Importance and a 3-point Frequency 
of Use scale.  All results were recorded in the online survey application.  In the analysis phase of 
Round 2, each of the Likert ratings were converted to numerical values and analyzed by 
calculating the mean, median and standard deviation for each critical factor for both Importance 
and Frequency of Use.  Then the Importance ratings were multiplied by the Frequency ratings for 
each response and the mean, median and standard deviations were calculated for the combined 
ratings Microsoft Excel was used for the analysis. 
 In Survey 3, each participant was given a survey with each critical factor listed, along 
with the median score, range of maximum and minimum scores of the group, and the 
participant’s own score for each factor.  Every participant was given the opportunity to revise 
their scores in light of the group responses.  Results were collected and stored in the online 
survey application. 
 All personal identity information pertaining to the participants was known only to the 
researcher.  All qualitative comments shared with the participants was cleansed of any 
identifiable characteristics.  There was no direct association from any of the data directly back to 
the participant in any part of the study. 
Data Analysis 
Data collection for each of the three rounds of surveys necessitated three different 
approaches to analysis. 
Survey 1 
 Survey 1 was generally qualitative in approach in that participants were asked to list all 
critical risk factors that come to mind in their decision-making process, along with a descriptor 
clarifying each factor.  During the analysis phase, the researcher combined the factors from all 
the lists, grouping them into categories.  Obvious duplicates were removed. 
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Survey 2 
 In Survey 2, the participants were asked to rate each critical risk factor on a 5-point 
Likert scale for Importance and a 3-point Likert scale for Frequency of Use.  The ratings were 
converted to numerical values as the results were exported from the online survey application 
and imported into Microsoft Excel.  Mean, median, and standard deviation, minimum, and 
maximum were calculated for each critical risk factor.  Hill and Fowles (1975) recommended the 
use of median as the preferred measure of central tendency for Delphi studies. For this reason, 
the median score was used in Survey 3 to convey the central tendency of the group for each 
critical risk factor.  The mean values were used in the analysis of the overall rankings for each 
critical risk factor.   
 These results were used to construct Survey 3 and presented along with each individual’s 
personal score for each critical factor so each participant could review the median score against 
their own rating. 
Survey 3 
 The list of critical risk factors constructed from the analysis of Survey 2 was distributed 
to the panelists with instructions to review their scores in light of the median and range for the 
group.  The participants were given the opportunity to revise their scores based on the knowledge 
of how their answers compared with their peers.  Analysis for Survey 3 was identical to Survey 2 
except that in addition to median and standard deviation, inter-quartile ranges were calculated for 
each factor (Green, 1982). 
Final Analysis 
 The first phase of final analysis was to determine which critical risk factors achieved 
consensus among the panel.  Ulschak (1983) recommended a criterion whereby 80 percent of 
ratings fall with two categories of a seven-point Likert scale as a measure of consensus.  Green 
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(1982) suggested that 70 percent should rate at least three or higher on a four point Likert scale 
with the median being 3.25 or higher.  For this study, any response where the rating was outside 
the range of one Likert point above or below the median was discarded.  The percentage of 
responses within this boundary was calculated. For any critical risk factor where 70% or greater 
of the responses were within plus or minus one Likert rating from the median, the factor was 
considered to be in consensus of the group.  Critical risk factors that fell below this consensus 
range of 70% were discard from the final analysis.   
 Further analysis was performed within subgroups of the participants; specifically, Angels 
versus Venture Capitalists (VC’s), to determine if there were differences in ranking of critical 
success factors and consensus. 
Summary 
 The methodology described in this chapter provided a framework to determine specific 
critical risk factors used heuristically by investors as they make their decisions about which 
startup companies to invest in.  The research methodology was a three-step Delphi study using a 
group of 18 experienced investors to identify a number critical risk factors with a high degree of 
consensus.  The results allowed the researcher to develop frameworks to assist entrepreneurs in 
crafting their company narratives to be more attractive to potential investors and avoid pitfalls 
that could result in being declined for investment based on nothing more than a subjective 
judgment.  Instrumentation for the study included three surveys delivered by the online survey 
application Qualtircs and analyzed with the use of Microsoft Excel. 
 Reliability and validity were achieved through use of an expert panel, carefully 
constructed surveys, anonymity of the participants, iteration of the process, and statistical 
aggregation of the resultant statistics 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA COLLECTION 
Introduction 
 The methodology for data collection and analysis was presented in Chapter 3.  In Chapter 
4, the process of data collection is presented along with summary data results based on the 
various analysis methods outlined for the Delphi research study.  In most cases data are 
presented using top quartiles for comparative purposes.  Full listings of all data results can be 
found in the following appendices:  
 Appendix B – Total Listing of Critical Risk Factors from Survey #1 
 Appendix C – Full Listing of Survey #2 Results – Unranked 
 Appendix D – Ranked Consensus Data By Consensus Range 
 Appendix E – Comparison of Ranked Consensus Data Between Angel Investors and 
Venture Capitalists 
Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this Delphi study was to determine if there is a common set of perceived 
critical risk factors among a group of experienced investors that could cause them to reject a deal 
out of hand.  The Delphi method was appropriate for this study because the information was 
uncertain, difficult to quantify, and subject to opinion (Hsu & Standford, 2007; Murray, 1979).   
Research Questions 
1. To what extent are critical risk factors are involved in the decision-making process of 
investors in considering a deal? 
2. Which critical risk factors (execution, market, technological, financial, regulatory, etc.) 
do investors consider to be common among most investment decisions? 
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3. Of these most common categories, what is the relative weight of importance among 
them? 
4. What differences occur among the critical risk factors between Angel investors and 
Venture Capitalists? 
Participants and Demographics 
For this Delphi Study, 15 participants were chosen as the minimum sample size.  In order 
to allow for possible attrition, 20 potential participants were recruited for the study.  Two 
participants failed to complete the survey process leaving 18 participants who were part of the 
total Delphi study. 
The strength of the Delphi Method is in the expertise of the panelists.  The criteria that 
were developed for recruiting participants include the following: 
 A minimum of 5 years experience in investing 
 A minimum of 10 deals in which they had primary decision-making authority 
 At least one positive net return 
Other criteria applied to the selection of participants included a balanced mix between Venture 
Capitalists and Angel Investors. 
There were nine Venture Capitalists and nine Angel Investors (Table 4 provides 
demographic information about the participants).  The group reported total investments of over 
$390 million in 745 deals.  The Venture Capitalists (VC’s) reported investing $367.7 million in 
523 deals for an average of $702,964 per deal, while the Angel Investors (Angels) invested 23.3 
million in 222 deals for an average of $104,955 per deal.   The average experience of the VC’s 
was 16.9 years with a range of 4 to 40 years.  The average Angel experience was 13.3 years with 
a range of 2 to 30 years.  The geographic dispersion of the participants was considered to 
represent the best funding opportunities for entrepreneurs across the state of Tennessee.  While 
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some investors’ home offices were located in other states, principally OH, KY, and CA, all these 
investors have conducted business within Tennessee.  The locations from which the investors 
conducted their investment activities included the following: 
Knoxville, TN 
Chattanooga, TN 
Johnson City, TN 
Memphis, TN 
 
Nashville, TN 
Johnson City, TN 
Greeneville, TN 
Bristol, TN 
 
Oak Ridge, TN 
Cincinnati, OH 
London, KY 
San Francisco, CA 
Table 4 
Participants’ Demographics 
Participant Investor Type Total Investment Total Deals Total Years 
1 Venture Capitalist  $25,900,000  85 10 
2 Venture Capitalist  $5,000,000  41 4 
3 Venture Capitalist  $250,000,000  150 33 
4 Venture Capitalist  $35,000,000  150 15 
5 Venture Capitalist  $50,000,000  48 18 
6 Venture Capitalist  $250,000  10 10 
7 Venture Capitalist  $1,500,000  14 5.5 
8 Venture Capitalist * 25 40 
9 Venture Capitalist * * * 
10 Angel Investor  $1,000,000  12 20 
11 Angel Investor  $2,400,000  45 17 
12 Angel Investor  $4,400,000  11 21 
13 Angel Investor  $1,500,000  12 7 
14 Angel Investor  $500,000  40 30 
15 Angel Investor  $2,000,000  15 10 
16 Angel Investor  $6,000,000  40 8 
17 Angel Investor  $300,000  22 2 
18 Angel Investor  $5,200,000  25 5 
Total  $390,950,000 745 255.5 
Note: * indicates participant did not report data. 
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Survey Distributions and Response Rate 
Survey 1 was the brainstorming stage of the Delphi Method.  It identified the critical risk 
factors that were important to each investor.  Survey 1 was distributed via email to all 20 
recruited participants on November 5, 2017.  Reminders were sent out on November 9, 2017.  
The survey was concluded on November 13, 2017 with 19 responses for a return rate of 95% and 
exceeding the minimum threshold of 15. 
Survey 2 was the rating stage in the Delphi Study, in which the investors were instructed 
to rate the critical risk factors for importance.  Survey #2 was distributed via email to 19 
participants on November 28, 2017 and the survey was concluded on December 13, 2017.  There 
were 18 responses for a return rate of 95%. 
Survey #3 was the consensus phase of the study whereby the participants reviewed their 
responses in context of the group ratings and were allowed to revise their ratings.  Survey #3 was 
distributed via email to 18 participants on December 19, 2017 and concluded on December 23, 
2017.  All 18 participants responded for a response rate of 100%. 
Survey 1: Construction, Methodology and Response Data 
Survey #1 was the brainstorming stage of the Delphi Study (see Appendix A).  Following 
a brief introduction and the Statement of Informed Consent, participants were asked for some 
general demographic information.  In the instructions for the survey, the participants were 
introduced to the concept of Critical Risk Factors and were instructed to list all the critical risk 
factors that come to mind in the investment stages that lead up to Due Diligence.  The survey 
provided for up to 25 critical risk factors to be listed in an open text field for each.  The 
participants were provided space to include any quantifiers they felt would clarify their choices. 
The 18 participants who responded to Survey 1 returned a total of 193 critical risk factors 
for mean of 11 critical risk factors per person.  The full listing of critical risk factors as reported 
  59 
in the survey appears in Appendix B.  The range of responses from participants was 5 to 22 from 
each participant (see Figure 3).  Most participants responded with between 8 and 14 critical risk 
factors. 
Upon initial review of the 193 critical risk factors identified by the participants, it was 
obvious there were multiple duplicates, although some were worded slightly different.  In order 
to consolidate the total list of critical risk factors and omit repeats, a set of categories was formed 
based on the nature of each response.  For example, factors such as trustworthiness and integrity 
were categorized as Relationship Factors while amount of investment and valuation were 
considered to be Investment and Finance Factors.  When Survey 2 was constructed and tested by 
the pilot group, it was suggested that the categories made the rating process simpler so the 
categories remained as part of the listing of results for Survey 1.  As shown in Table 5, once 
consolidated and categorized, there were a total of 82 critical risk factors distributed in 7 
categories.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Participant Response Rate 
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Table 5 
Critical Risks Factors by Category 
Category Critical Risk Factors 
 
Founders and Management Team 
 
Founder’s Experience – Industry 
Founder’s Experience – Previous Startups 
Founder’s Experience – Leadership 
Founder’s Experience – Technical 
Founder(s) commitment to startup 
Founder’s Experience – Startups 
Founder’s Experience – Business Model 
Founder’s mindset toward growth 
Ability to execute 
Perseverance 
Founders desirous of liquidation and exit 
Open position on management team 
Existence and quality of Advisory Board 
Strength of the Business Plan 
Strategic Metrics and Milestones 
Operational execution relative to supply chain 
Relationship 
Coachability 
Relationship between founders 
Transparency 
Company/Investor cultural fit 
Management ‘skin in the game’ 
Trustworthiness 
Passion 
Ethics/Honesty 
Integrity 
Character 
“X” Factor instincts 
Market, Competitive Landscape, Scalability 
and Early Sales 
Total addressable market (size) 
Market growth rate 
Market segmentation – Consolidated vs. 
fractured 
Go-to-market strategy 
Product/Market fit 
Timing in market life cycle 
Understanding of market trends 
Understanding of competitive landscape 
Overall number of competitors 
Competitor market share 
 (continued) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
Category Critical Risk Factors 
Market, Competitive Landscape, Scalability 
and Early Sales (continued) 
Ability to scale 
Strategy for growth 
Scale with minimal capital 
Sales strategy 
Early traction 
Existing revenues 
Revenue model 
Technology and Value Proposition 
Disruptive in the market 
“Me Too” technology 
Easily copied or reverse engineered 
MVP identified and available (Prototype) 
Development timeline 
Platform technology 
Demonstrated customer discovery 
Problem, not solution focused 
Clear and unique value proposition 
Investment and Financial 
Amount of investment 
Valuation 
Follow-on funding needed 
Terms 
Clean Cap Table 
Ability to attract co-investors 
Realistic return expectations 
M&A Landscape 
Investment stage – seed, early growth 
Realistic pro forma 
Little or no debt 
Reasonable burn rate 
Projected gross margins 
Time to Exit 
Potential for good return 
Economic conditions favorable for exit 
Potential disruptive technology affecting exit 
Clean balance sheet 
Exit strategy 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Category Critical Risk Factors 
Regulatory and Legal 
No pending or existing litigation 
Founder’s need for NDA 
Regulatory barriers 
Political risks 
Existing IP 
Competitive advantage 
Other barriers to entry 
Other Factors Location of company “Wow” factor 
Intriguing narrative 
 
Survey 2: Construction, Methodology and Response Data 
Survey #2 was the rating stage of the Delphi study.  When the list of critical risk factors 
was determined by the participants, the next step was to have the participants assign importance 
ratings to each critical factor.  However, upon review of the sheer volume of critical risk factors 
yielded by Survey 1, two concerns emerged.  The initial expectation of Survey 1 was that there 
would be 18 - 24 critical risk factors based on the research reported in the literature review.  A 
simple Likert type rating scale would be sufficient to differentiate the more important factors 
from those less important.  Yet, with 82 critical risk factors, the first concern was whether the 
participants would be able to distinguish between so many factors.  The second concern was 
whether there would be enough diversity in a 5-point Importance scale to differentiate a smaller 
number of highly important risk factors from the list of 82. 
Two proposed solutions were developed.  The first was to simply increase the Likert 
rating scale from 5 to 10.  The second solution was to introduce a matrix type of rating system 
that would allow rating along two dimensions.  Upon consultation with Dr. Timothy Munyon, a 
survey expert at the University of Tennessee, the researcher decided to implement the second 
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option.  The original 5-point Likert scale was retained as a measure of importance and a 3-point 
frequency scale was added.  For each critical risk factor, the participants were asked to rate each 
critical risk factor using a 5-point scale for importance and a 3-point scale for frequency of use.  
Results from this strategy would yield data according to the original intent of the research design, 
but would provide additional data in case the results did not have enough diversity to 
differentiate a smaller population of the most important risk factors.   
Survey 2 was constructed from the results of Survey 1 using the consolidated list of 
critical risk factors organized by their respective categories.  A copy of the full survey is in 
Appendix A.  Participants were directed to rate each critical risk factor as follows: 
The following definitions correspond to each rating of the importance scale with the 
numerical value of the rating in parentheses:  
 Not Important - This factor is not considered early in the process (1 point) 
 Minimally Important - This factor is worth mentioning (2 points) 
 Moderately Important - This factor is considered based on circumstances (3 points) 
 Important - This factor is usually considered for most cases (4 points) 
 Critically Important - This factor is a sudden death deal breaker (5 points) 
The Frequency of Use scale defined how often the critical risk factor was considered:  
 Never - I never consider this factor (1 point) 
 Occasionally - I use this factor from time to time (2 points) 
 Always - I never make a decision without considering this factor (3 points) 
At the conclusion of Survey 2, The Likert scale ratings were converted to corresponding 
numerical values using a tool in the Qualtrics survey application.  A set of statistical calculations 
were applied to the data using Microsoft Excel that included, mean, standard deviation, median, 
minimum, and maximum for the data related to the Importance rating.  In addition, the numerical 
values for the 5-point Importance rating were each multiplied by the 3-point Frequency rating for 
a Combined rating in case it proved necessary.  A full listing of the data results is included in 
Appendix C. 
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The data were ranked by mean score in order of highest to lowest and then the listing was 
separated into quartiles.  The mean data range from the Importance data only was 3.24 to 4.94.  
The data range for Importance and Frequency combined was 6.61 to 14.56.  Although there were 
some differences in actual ranking between the two methods, when analyzed by quartile, there 
was only one factor that moved from one quartile to the next.  Based on the broad range of mean 
values across the population of data, and the minimal impact on quartile placement, it was 
determined that mean data for the Importance rating were sufficient for final analysis and in 
keeping with the original research methodology. The critical risk factors were ranked by mean 
score for Importance in the top two quartiles (see Table 6). 
Table 6 
Critical Risk Factors Ranked by Mean Values (Top Two Quartiles) 
Critical Risk Factors Mean Value 
Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness 4.94 
Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty 4.94 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup 4.89 
Relationship Factors - Integrity 4.89 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute 4.82 
Relationship Factors - Coachability 4.82 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance 4.76 
Relationship Factors - Character 4.72 
Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage 4.71 
Relationship Factors - Passion 4.67 
Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape 4.61 
Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return 4.61 
Relationship Factors - Transparency 4.59 
Market Factors - Product/Market Fit 4.59 
Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Proposition 4.56 
Legal Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation 4.56 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Critical Risk Factors Mean Value 
Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game' 4.50 
Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale 4.50 
Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth 4.47 
Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy 4.39 
Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model 4.39 
Investment Factors - Terms 4.39 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth 4.35 
Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype) 4.35 
Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy 4.33 
Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed 4.29 
Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry 4.29 
Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate 4.28 
Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused 4.27 
Value Proposition Factors - Demonstrated Customer Discovery 4.25 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones 4.22 
Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit 4.18 
Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth 4.18 
Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size) 4.17 
Investment Factors - Valuation 4.17 
Technology Factors - Development Timeline 4.13 
Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders 4.12 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry 4.11 
Exit Factors - Exit Strategy 4.11 
Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP 4.11 
Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction 4.06 
Note: Dotted line represents boundary between the 1st and 2nd quartiles 
 Among the critical risk factors in the top quartile, two categories emerged more often 
than others.  The relationship category was the most important with 6 in the top ten, and 8 in the 
top quartile.  Founders and Management team followed with 3 in the top ten and 5 in the top 
quartile.  The other categories were fairly well distributed. 
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Survey 3: Construction, Methodology and Response Data 
Survey 3 was the consensus stage of the Delphi process.  The participants were shown 
each critical risk factor, along with its calculated median score and the range of median scores 
from minimum to maximum.  A table was created listing each participant along with their score 
for each critical risk factor.  The Qualtrics survey application cross-referenced each critical risk 
factor with the individual score of each participant from Survey 2, allowing them to compare 
their scores with the median and the range of the group.  The participants were instructed to 
consider their original response in comparison to the median of the group and they were offered 
the opportunity to change their score based on this information.  They could either stay within 
consensus (represented by the median score) or remain outside.  It is important to restate that the 
participants had no knowledge of who the other participants were and no way of knowing how 
anyone else but themselves responded.  A copy of Survey 3 is in Appendix A. 
Consensus Effect 
A total of 57 ratings were changed during Survey 3 for an average of 3.2 per participant.  
The number of participants who chose to make changes in their initial ratings as a result of 
comparing with the group median and range was well distributed (see Figure 4).  
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 Figure 4.  Number of Participants Making Changes 
The majority (34) of the changes appeared to change from the participants’ original score 
to the median.  Eleven changes were made to fill in blanks left in Survey #2.  Six changes were 
made away from the median and six were made toward the median but not to match it. 
Analysis of Consensus 
 The data from Survey 2 was used to compare the changes in participant responses in 
Survey 3.  Each response that was a change from the original score was replaced with the new 
score.  New statistics were calculated and the results were ranked.  There were several critical 
risk actors that had movement within the ranked list; all of which only moved one or two places 
with two exceptions.  The critical factor, “Ability to Execute” moved into first position in the top 
quartile after the consensus phase. The critical factor, “Demonstrated Customer Discovery” 
moved from mid-quartile two up into the first quartile showing the impact of the group 
consensus on that one critical risk factor. 
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 Based on the research methodology developed by Ulschak (1983) who recommended a 
criterion of 80 percent of ratings fall with two categories of a seven-point Likert scale as a 
measure of consensus; and Green (1982) who suggested that 70 percent should rate at least three 
or higher on a four point Likert scale with the median being 3.25 or higher, consensus ranges for 
this research were developed based on one Likert score above and one below the median. For a 
median score of 5, the consensus range was between 4 and 5. For a median score of 4, the 
consensus rage was between 3 and 5.  For a median score of 3, the consensus rage was between 2 
and 4.  
 The Importance rating scores for Survey 3 were analyzed against these consensus ranges 
and any score that fell outside the range was identified.  The number of outside-range scores 
were then totaled for each critical risk factor.  The research methodology called for identifying 
critical risk factors according to the overall consensus of the group of participants based on 70% 
of the responses being within the Consensus Range.  Based on an analysis of the number of 
critical risk factors within the consensus range, three critical risk factors were below 70% 
consensus and were discarded from the final ranking.  They were Strength of the Business Plan, 
Existing Revenues, and Founder’s Need for non-disclosure agreements.  Twenty-two critical risk 
factors were within 100% consensus of the group (see Table 7).  The overall ranked lists for 
70%, 80% and 100% consensus are in Appendix D.  It should be noted that some deliberation 
was given to whether the consensus threshold should be 70% or 80% given there were references 
for either method.  Upon review of the data, there was only one critical risk factor in the top two 
quartiles that was below 80%.  Setting the threshold at 80% would have had minimal impact on 
the most important factors.  Therefore, the threshold of consensus remained at 70% for this 
study. 
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Table 7 
Distribution of Critical Risk Factors Across Range of Consensus 
Rate of Consensus Participants within Range Critical Risk Factors  
within Range 
100% 
80 – 99% 
70 – 80% 
Below 70% 
18 
15 – 17 
13 – 14 
12 or fewer 
22 
44 
13 
3 
 
The final ranking of critical risk factors with at least 70% consensus resulted in 39 factors 
in the top two quartiles ranging in importance from 4.1 to 5.0 (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8 
 
Ranking of Critical Risk Factors with at least 70% Consensus 
 
Critical Risk Factors Mean Value 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute 5 
Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness 5 
Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty 4.94 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup 4.89 
Relationship Factors - Integrity 4.89 
Relationship Factors - Coachability 4.82 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance 4.76 
Relationship Factors - Character 4.72 
Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage 4.71 
Relationship Factors - Passion 4.67 
Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape 4.67 
Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return 4.67 
Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game' 4.61 
Relationship Factors - Transparency 4.59 
Market Factors - Product/Market Fit 4.59 
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Table 8 (continued) 
   Note: Dotted line indicates boundary between Quartile #1 and Quartile #2 
 
Comparing Angel Investors with Venture Capitalists 
 The final data set from Survey 3 was sorted by “Investor Type” and separated into two 
data sets, one for Angel Investors and the other for Venture Capitalists.  An analysis of 
consensus was performed using the same parameters previously discussed.  The number of 
participants was evenly split across each Investor Type: nine Angel Investors and nine Venture 
Capitalists.  The consensus within each group was higher than with the one large group as shown 
Critical Risk Factors Mean Value 
Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Proposition 4.56 
Legal Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation 4.56 
Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth 4.53 
Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale 4.50 
Value Proposition Factors - Demonstrated Customer Discovery 4.44 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth 4.41 
Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy 4.39 
Investment Factors - Terms 4.39 
Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy 4.33 
Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype) 4.33 
Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed 4.29 
Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model 4.28 
Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate 4.28 
Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry 4.28 
Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused 4.25 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones 4.22 
Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders 4.18 
Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit 4.18 
Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth 4.18 
Investment Factors - Valuation 4.17 
Technology Factors - Development Timeline 4.12 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry 4.11 
Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size) 4.11 
Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table 4.11 
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in Table 9.  The Venture Capitalists had 47 instances of 100% consensus while the Angels had 
31.  The Angels had nearly three times the number of factors that fell outside consensus than did 
the Venture Capitalists. 
Table 9 
Comparison of Consensus Between Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists 
Rate of Consensus All Participants Angel Investors Venture Capitalists 
100% 
80 – 99% 
70 – 80% 
Below 70% 
23 
42 
13 
4 
31 
18 
20 
13 
47 
21 
9 
5 
 
 The critical risk factors were ranked for each Investor Type based on newly calculated 
statistics within each group.  The total listings are in Appendix E.  The respective listings for the 
top quartiles for Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists were compared in Table 10.  Although 
not identical, the lists are substantially similar in that 12 specific critical risk factors were present 
in the top quartile of both lists.  However, there were some differences as marked in the table. 
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Table 10 
Comparison of Final Consensus Rankings 
 
Angel Investor Consensus Final Data 
 
 
Venture Capitalist Consensus Final Data 
 
Founders and Management - Ability to execute 
Relationship - Coachability 
Relationship - Trustworthiness 
Relationship - Ethics/Honesty 
Relationship - Integrity 
Founders and Management - Founder(s) commitment 
Relationship - Character 
Understanding of Competitive Landscape*** 
Intellectual Property - Competitive Advantage 
Relationship - Passion 
Founders and Management - Perseverance 
Relationship – Transparency*** 
Market - Product/Market Fit*** 
Investment – Terms*** 
Legal - No Pending or Existing Litigation*** 
Relationship - Management 'skin in the game' 
Value Proposition - Unique Value Proposition 
Founders and Management - Founder(s) commitment 
Founders and Management Team - Ability to execute 
Relationship - Trustworthiness 
Founders and Management Team - Perseverance 
Relationship - Ethics/Honesty 
Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return*** 
Relationship - Company/Investor cultural fit*** 
Relationship - Management 'skin in the game' 
Relationship - Integrity 
Traction and Revenue - Revenue Model*** 
Relationship - Coachability 
Relationship - Passion 
Relationship - Character 
Market - Go-to-market Strategy*** 
Scaleability - Ability to Scale*** 
Scaleability - Strategy for Growth*** 
Value Proposition - Unique Value Proposition 
Investment - Follow-on Funding Needed*** 
Intellectual Property - Competitive Advantage 
Note: Fewer critical risk factors appear in the top quartile for Angel Investors because several critical risk 
factors were removed because of a lack of consensus between the Angel Investors.  To highlight differences, 
critical risk factors were marked with triple asterisks (***) to indicate which factors were unique to their 
respective lists. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1 of this study, the purpose was presented, which was to determine if there 
were common categories of critical risk factors among a group of investors and to quantify each 
category with respect to importance in the decision-making process.  The Delphi method was 
appropriate for this study because the information was uncertain, difficult to quantify, and 
subject to opinion (Hsu & Standford, 2007; Murray, 1979).  Chapter 2 set a context for the study 
by reviewing the literature, which introduced both objective and subjective methods conveyed by 
investors during and after the investment processes.  The literature revealed that the investment 
process occurs through stages, with more subjective criteria at play in the early stages, and then 
more objective measure at the close of a deal.  Chapter 3 presented how the Delphi method was 
chosen and would be implemented for this study.  Chapter 4 presented summaries of the data at 
every phase of the Delphi process used in this study. 
 In Chapter 5, analyses of these data and conclusions are presented with respect to each of 
the research questions.  A summary of the Delphi approach is presented followed by implications 
of this study and recommendations for further research. 
Research Questions 
1. To what extent are critical risk factors are involved in the decision-making process of 
investors in considering a deal? 
2. Which critical risk factors (execution, market, technological, financial, regulatory, etc.) 
do investors consider to be common among most investment decisions? 
3. Of these most common categories, what is the relative weight of importance among 
them? 
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4. What differences occur among the critical risk factors between Angel investors and 
Venture Capitalists? 
Conclusions 
Research Question 1 
A total of 193 critical risk factors were reported by 18 participants for an average of 11 
critical risk factors per participant.  Although the range of responses was between 5 and 22, most 
participants reported between 8 and 14 critical risk factors.  It is clear these participants were 
aware of certain criteria they are looking for when engaged in the initial stages of a potential 
investment.  However, judging from the high level of consensus in the consolidated listing of 82 
critical risk factors, (only 3 factors were discarded due to a lack of consensus), and the fact that 
the top two quartiles rated 4.00 (Important) to 5.00 (Critically Important), there is evidence to 
support the idea that there are far more critical risk factors at play in investment decisions than a 
mere dozen or so.  Even if one considers a consensus threshold of 100%, there were 19 critical 
risk factors rated above 4.0.   
Investors use their own set of critical risk factors in their decision-making process to a 
great extent.  This research pointed out that there are more critical risk factors involved with 
investors’ decision-making process than came to mind when they were initially asked to list 
them. 
Research Question 2 
 With 82 critical risk factors summarized from 18 participant responses and half of them 
being rated 4.0 or higher in importance at a high level of consensus, any expectations of a 
concise listing of a dozen critical risk factors could not be realized.  However, if one analyzes the 
top quartile with a consensus threshold of greater than 80%, a manageable answer to this 
research question begins to emerge.  Of 17 critical risk factors meeting this condition, nearly 
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half, or 8 factors are related to relationship including Trustworthiness, Transparency, Ethics, 
Integrity, Coachability, Character, and Passion.  The top two factors, each with a mean score of 
importance of 5 out of 5 are Trustworthiness and Management Ability to Execute.  Rounding out 
the balance of the list are factors that include Founder Commitment, Perseverance, Competitive 
Advantage with Respect to IP, Potential for a Good Return, Product Market Fit, Clear and 
Unique Value Proposition, and finally, No Existing Litigation.  Surprisingly absent from this 
listing are any financial related factors.  The Revenue Model shows up as a critical factor well 
down in the second quartile with a mean score of 4.44.  Clearly relationship based critical risk 
factors form the most important and claim the highest consensus as a category of all the other, 
more objectively based measures. 
Research Question 3 
In order to assist in the process of consolidating the 193 responses from Survey 1, 
categories were identified which represented critical risk factors of some similarity.  Of the 
categories in the top two quartiles with a consensus threshold of greater than 70%, there were 10 
critical risk factors in the Relationship Category (average mean score: 4.66), followed by 6 
factors in each of the Management Team (4.58) and Investment categories (4.19).  The category 
of Market Factors (4.27), followed with 4 while Scalability (4.45), Value Propsition (4.42), and 
Intellectual Property (4.37) each had 3 factors within the category.  Rounding out the top ten 
categories were Exit, Intellectual Property and Revenue, each with two factors in their respective 
categories.   
Relationship factors carried the most weight as well as the most factors identified as a 
category, followed by Management Team factors, which were reflected in much of the research 
literature.  It is interesting to note that Scalability Factors ranked next based on average 
importance (4.45) even though there were half the number of factors than the Investment 
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category.  Value Proposition, with 3 factors ranked next in importance with a category mean of 
4.42.  Factors related to Exit Strategy completed the top five categories with a category mean of 
4.39.  
What is striking about this analysis is the profound difference of the Relationship 
category compared to all the others.  The Relationship category consists of the “soft” 
characteristics that are typically more subjective such as “Trustworthiness”, “Character”, or 
“Integrity”, whereas the other categories can be evaluated typically by some objective measure.  
Among all the prior research reviewed, there were studies that focused on one (subjective) or the 
other (objective) approach but none were found that combined subjective categories with the 
more objective categories.  This study placed the two together and Relationship factors rose to 
the top of importance among the objectively measured factors.  
Research Question 4 
 The differences between how Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists responded are 
significant from a number of perspectives.  Looking first at the general rankings of critical risk 
factors between the two groups, there were 12 critical factors shared between the two groups.  Of 
those, 7 were within 3 positions of each other on the ranking scale and the remaining 5 were in 
completely different positions within the quartile.  Of those remaining, there were 5 factors 
unique to the Angle Investors in their top quartile while the Venture Capitalists had 7 unique 
critical risk factors in their top quartile.  Where there was agreement between the two groups, it 
was consistent but the divergences were drastic pointing out that as group, Angel Investors and 
Venture Capitalists have different perspectives from each other.  The factors unique to the Angel 
Investors included Competitive Landscape, Transparency, Product/Market Fit, Investment Terms 
and No Existing Litigation.  Factors unique to the Venture Capitalists include Return Potential, 
Cultural Fit, Revenue Model, Go-to-Market Strategy, Scalability and follow-on Funding.  
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 The other clear difference between Angel Investors and the Venture Capitalists was the 
rate of consensus.  As for the number of critical risk factors excluded due to falling below 70%, 
the total group discarded three factors, but the Angels excluded 13 while the Venture Capitalists 
only excluded 5.  Among those critical risk factors rated 100% consensus, the Angel Investors 
had only 31 while the Venture Capitalists had 47.  In fact, all the critical risk factors in the first 
quartile of the Venture Capitalists rated 100% while the Angel Investors only had 9 critical risk 
factors rated at 100% consensus in their top quartile.  In summary, the Venture Capitalists were 
much more aligned as a group than the Angel Investors, and there were distinct differences 
among the critical risk factors rated most important between the two groups.  This indicated that 
Angel Investors tended to think more independently as a group and between each other. 
Conclusions Regarding the Delphi Method and the Consensus Effect 
 The Delphi Method was chosen for this study because the information was uncertain, 
difficult to quantify, and subject to opinion (Hsu & Standford, 2007; Murray, 1979).  It would 
have been much simpler to aggregate a comprehensive list of critical risk factors from other 
studies and engage a population of investors to rate them on relative importance. But that method 
would have potentially excluded critical risk factors not discovered by those researchers.  This 
was evidenced in the results of Survey 1.  When asked the open-ended question, “Please list all 
the critical risk factors you look for when evaluating a potential investment deal,” the 
participants responded with anywhere from 5 to 22 responses for a total of 193 responses.  After 
the ranking process of Survey 2, it was clear they valued more critical risk factors as important 
than what came to mind during the brainstorming in Survey 1.  Over 40 of the critical risk factors 
in the top two quartiles were rated between 4.0 (Important) and 5.0 (Critically Important).  The 
consensus of these ratings almost doubles the highest number of critical risk factors envisioned 
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by any individual alone.  Clearly, as a group, these investors identified more important risk 
factors than they came up with individually. 
 The consensus phase of Survey 3 had a direct influence on the individual participants in 
more than one respect.  First, a number of responses in Survey 2 were left blank for reasons 
known only to the participants.  When given the opportunity to review the data a second time, 
there were 11 cases where previously blank ratings were filled in.  In 34 cases, the original rating 
for the participant was changed to match the median score.  Out of a total of 1,476 individual 
responses, 4% (57) rankings were changed as a result of reflection on the group responses.  But 
this belies another effect of consensus at the Investor Type level, especially among the Angel 
Investors who excluded 13 of 82 critical risk factors (18%) as a result of the consensus phase of 
the study.   
The consensus scores for each critical risk factor underscored the importance rating, 
especially for those factors where there was 100% consensus.  One can be sure that Political 
Risks with an importance rating of 3.3 was significantly less important to the investor than 
Trustworthiness, which was rated a perfect 5.0, each at 100% consensus. 
In summary, the investors were more creative as a group and within their respective 
Investor Types than they were as individuals and their collective, consensus-forming 
collaboration underscored the validity of the importance ratings they determined.   
Implications of the Study 
At least three participants are active in Angel Capital Groups, which are groups of Angel 
Investors who come together to review and evaluate potential deals.  These individuals are 
interested, not only in the results of this study as it might pertain to their own groups, but they 
may be interested in conducting Delphi studies of their own within their groups. 
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For this group of investors, the impact of this survey could assist them in gaining a better 
understanding of how decisions are made within the group, allowing them to place more weight 
on those factors seen as more critical to the investment process than others. For individual 
investors, this research will provide an evidence based framework for them to compare their own 
decision-making process.  The fact that the Relationship based factors proved to be more 
important than objectively measured factors, coupled with the finding that these two types of 
factors are in play at the same time, shows the complexity of decision making in early stage 
investments, which cannot be distilled into a simple checklist for the benefit of either investor or 
entrepreneur.  This research does provide some definition to this complexity.  The relative high 
degree of consensus within the most important factors may bring confidence to individual 
investors that their experience is confirmed by their peers and affords them an opportunity to 
review their biases in light of how they rate against their peers. 
Unfortunately, for entrepreneurs, this study did not result in a concise, 5-point checklist 
or framework they can use to help guarantee they secure an investment.  Despite any clarity this 
study brings to the process, there will still be a fraction of funding resources available to all who 
are seeking it.  Investors will still have to decide to decline far more investment deals than they 
will close.  But what this study does for entrepreneurs is document how complex the process is, 
with all the variables that come into play.  The consensus effect underscored this reality and 
should provide a more realistic alternative to all the Top Ten Things Investors Look For that 
show up in ubiquitous blogs on the subject.  The other implication for entrepreneurs is the fact 
that there are dual/parallel tracks of critical risk factors at play: those related to relationship and 
those related to more objective, measurable factors.  Much attention is currently given to 
constructing financial statements and business models, backed by market research, founder’s 
experience and technology.  Relationships take time to build, which helps in part to explain why 
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invest deals take such a long time.  This research suggests that among all the capabilities and 
personality traits ascribed to entrepreneurs, yet another, very important skill must be developed 
by the CEO of entrepreneurial startups, and this is the ability to form strong relationships over 
time with those who have the financial capital to help grow the company. 
For instructors, advisors, and coaches of entrepreneurs (as well as entrepreneurs 
themselves), this study identified seven major categories and up to a dozen sub-categories that 
could be used to develop a framework to begin tackling the task of teaching how investors make 
their decisions.   
One remaining fact that challenges the findings of this research is that most startups have 
to find a way to grow without the funding from equity investors; either through self-funding or 
organic growth from reinvesting proceeds from the business.  In other words, most startups will 
never engage with investors.  However, the implications for these businesses, although subtle, 
are quite relevant.  Investors are interested in a substantial return on investment and this research 
categorized a complex set of factors, any of which could render the investment opportunity 
worthless should the perceived risk outweigh the potential returns.  Investors are interested in 
what will add value to a new venture and enable it to grow, which are two conditions that should 
be of vital importance to the CEO of a startup company.  Investors see hundreds of deals and 
evaluate them quickly against this complex set of risk criteria. This research has shown these 
criteria have a high level of consensus among a diverse set of investors.  This cumulative 
expertise suggests that what is good for the investor is good for the entrepreneur and vice versa.   
Entrepreneurs, and those who advise and teach them, would do well to consider and apply the 
risk factors identified in this research as a measure of overall risk to the business, regardless of 
their need to raise equity based capital.  A company that is in a good position to raise money, 
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should they need it, is better off than one that needs funding and cannot attract it due to a high 
perceived level of risk. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 This study was conducted with participants primarily from Tennessee, although the group 
included one from Kentucky, two from Ohio and one from California.  One cannot assume these 
findings apply to other geographic locations. Entrepreneurial ecosystems across different regions 
are often influenced by past successes in specific industries.  Successful entrepreneurs may 
become investors in other startups as a way to give back, as well as increase their personal 
fortunes, and they tend to invest in business similar to those they have experience.  For that 
reason alone, one should conclude there are potentially different critical risk factors at play in 
different geographical regions. For example, a region where medical devices and drug discovery 
are common might render more importance to regulatory and legal factors than the participants 
for this study.  In regions where equity capital is abundant, investors may have higher risk 
tolerances than in regions where capital is scarcer.   
 A recommendation for further study would be to replicate this Delphi study across 
different regions to identify common critical risk factors across a broader geography.  The 
research technique could be applied within homogenous groups like Angel Funds and Investment 
Groups to determine if there are specific factors important to the group as a whole.    
 The 82 critical risk factors identified in this study could be tested in a quantitative study 
across a large geographical region through a nationwide member-based organization such as the 
Angel Capital Association or the National Venture Capital Association to correlate more 
demographic criteria with relative importance of the critical risk factors.  This would determine 
if there are differences in how investors view risk based on geography, economy, and industry 
sectors in different regions of the US. 
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 Of the objective based critical risk factors reveled in this research, many if not most have 
a range of measure within each criterion.  For example, Return Potential is a factor that could be 
measured in dollars or percentage or multiples of return.  This research did not determine the 
boundaries of those ranges for critical risk factors that can be measured numerically.  It would be 
useful to know if Angel Investors’ expectations for return differ from those of Venture 
Capitalists.  Further research could identify the ranges of expectation among the numerically 
measurable critical risk factors. 
 Of those critical risk factors that are more subjective, especially among the Relationship 
category, there is little known about how, or even if these factors can be quantified in any way. 
Trustworthiness is important but just how investors evaluate this factor would be a topic for 
further qualitative research. The list of Relationship based critical risk factors could be studied 
qualitatively to more deeply understand what investors are looking for as they build relationship 
in potential investment deals 
 Another recommendation for further study is to perform higher level statistically based 
consensus analyses on this data set to look for correlations.  Of particular interest would be to 
investigate the interplay between relationship and non-relationship factors.  Finally, a qualitative 
debrief of the participants in this study might reveal additional relevance in the use of the Delphi 
Method for this kind of research. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Delphi Surveys 
 
Default Question Block
Thank you for participating in this research project.  This study is the subject of a dissertation in
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Education from East Tennessee State
University. I hope you will ﬁnd this process enjoyable and informative.  This survey is in three basic
parts.
The ﬁrst is the compulsory Statement of Informed Consent, which is typical with any academic
research project where participants are involved. 
The second part is some very basic demographic information, which will be held strictly
conﬁdential and used to understand trends and categories in the analysis phase of the project.
The third part is a basic open survey question.
The entire survey should take 10 - 15 minutes.
When you are ready, click on the orange arrow box to continue.
Qualtrics Survey Software https://utk.co1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSur...
1 of 7 10/9/17, 9:37 PM
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Default Question Block
Welcome to Survey #2. 
 
In this survey, you will see a comprehensive listing of all the responses from all participants.  Every effort was made to
carefully consolidate this list by combining obvious duplicates.  In some cases certain terms were interpreted to mean
the same; such as Total Addressable Market, Market Size, Market sufficient to achieve scale, etc.  Your efforts produced
a very impressive set of critical risk factors as you will see. 
Your task now is to rate each critical risk factor based on its importance to you.
For your convenience, the critical risk factors have been arranged in categories.  As you prepare for this survey, please
keep these things in mind:
Consider and rate the factors you commonly use early in the investment process, during the time
prior to due dilligence, when you are forming relationships.  These should be things that come up
during presentations, conversations and early meetings.
Go with your immediate first reaction.  Do not try to over-analyze a factor. Your first impression is
usually indicitive of your judgement.
This list far exceeds the total number of any individual's responses.  If you see a response you did not mention in
Survey #1 but would like to rate it, please do so.
But, do not feel you have to rate every response as important.
Qualtrics Survey Software https://utk.co1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetS...
1 of 13 12/28/17, 2:15 PM
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Default Question Block
Welcome to Survey #3. 
 
This is the Consensus phase of the Delphi process.  In this 3rd and final survey, you have the
opportunity to see your responses to Survey #2 and compare them to how the rest of the participants
responded as a group to each critical risk factor.  For each factor, you will see the median score, the
range, and your score.  You may consider your response within the range of the group and you have
the opportunity to change your score if you choose to do so. The analysis of this phase will
determine the group consensus of the most important critical risk factors.
The median is the middle value of all the responses of the group.  For example in the following range
of numbers, the median is 4 and the range is 3 - 5:
3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 5
 
Qualtrics Survey Software https://utk.co1.qualtrics.com/ControlPanel/Ajax.php?action=GetSu...
1 of 11 12/13/17, 11:32 AM
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Appendix B: Total Listing of Critical Risk Factors from Survey #1 
 
Founders Experience  Reasonable deal structure, including pre‐money 
Intellectual Property  Understanding of market and competitors 
Total Addressable Market  Reasonable financial projections 
# of competitors, fractured market  Reasonable stated meterics that will lead to new funding round 
Regulatory hurdles  Advisors working with the company 
Time to market  Early traction in the market 
Exit strategies  Does company have a reasonable burn rate 
Time to exit  Trustworthiness 
Ability to scale  Management team willingness to take advice 
How much investment  Realistic growth potential of investment 
Can we attract co‐investors  Competitive risks 
Could Google destroy us with 50 engineers in a room for a 
month  Resources contributed by founder/CEO 
Other team members needed  Understanding of the product/service 
when will we know if this will succeed or fail  Ability of founder/CEO to communicate 
Growth mindset of founders  Amount of my time/additional investment required 
Relationship between founders  Ability to execute or past performance to benchmarks 
Source of investment  Ability to build team 
Motivation of founders to work on startup  CEO's ability to sell "ice cream to eskimos" 
Focus on problem, not solution  Clearly identified customer/market problem 
The Entrepreneur ‐   Solution well defined that fits a specific market need 
Is the entrepreneur investing in the proposed deal  Large, growing market 
Quality of management team  Clear value proposition for customer that compels a purchase 
Quality of the proposed deal  Intellectual property 
how doe it fit in the proposed market place  Management team who is committed w/skin in the game 
who is competion  Good assessment of competition + defined way to successfully compete 
what is size of the individual competitior  unique idea 
marketing strategy  validated customers 
sales strategy  compelling value proposition 
plan to scale up the proposed business  big achievable market 
How realistic is Business Plan with Pro Forma Financials  competent, experienced, engaging founder, leader 
Did entrepreneur prepare the Business Plan  well rounded, COACHABLE management team 
Can entrepreneur fluently discuss the Business Plan  revenue/traction 
What is proposed exit strategy  "reasonable", defensible valuation 
How long will money be invested before proposed exit  smart raise amount and terms 
market risk  exciting exit potential 
team  Debt load 
industry expertise  Management experience/prior success 
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total cash needed  Product sector and likelihood of success 
competition  Comparison of cultures 
technology risk  Extent to which management is organized and has a plan 
Stage of Startup  macro trends of the market being entered 
Industry Sector  technical co‐founder assuming it's a tech enabled business 
Location  leadership experiences of the founder 
Addressable Market  is the founder coachable? 
Foundational Team  reality check w/ the founder of the difficult task ahead 
Advisory Board  customer discovery that has taken place 
Revenue  future capital needed 
Debt  competitive landscape 
Board Observer and Information Rights Required Regardless of 
Investment Level  Perceived Integrity and Trustworthiness of the team 
Founders Open to and Desirous of Liquidation Event   Experience or lack of experience of the  team 
Founders do Not Require NDA  Is this an app with all revenue derived from advertising 
Logical "Go to Market" Strategy  Is this a "me too" investment or a true innovation 
Focused Product or Services Offering  What is expected capital required to scale?  
Clean BS with "Accredited Investors" 
Does the initial presentation demonstrate a fundamental  
understanding of the market? 
No Third Party Brokers or Intermediaries  Is the valuation reasonable? 
Team is Coachable  Single founder vs. team? 
No Litigation in Process  market size is sufficient to achieve scale 
Valuation 
Does the company have a feature or is it capable of being a  
complete business? 
Transparent Management Discussions  Experience of the founder 
Minimal Regulation  Valuation 
Must be Scalable with Minimal Capital  Deal terms 
Prefer MVP Product Already Developed  Product‐market fit and supporting data, especially sales 
Industry knowledge of the venture  Size of addressable market 
Understanding of the Risks  Proprietary position/competitive advantage 
Entrepreneurial experience  Management team 
Intriguing narraative  Location 
Disruptive idea or technology  Experience of the founder 
Passion for the project  Valuation 
Entrepreneur Risk 1: Will they stick with it when going gets 
tough?  Deal terms 
Entrepreneur Risk 2: Do they have experience in the industry?  Product‐market fit and supporting data, especially sales 
Market Risk 1: Does anyone want the product?  Are they really 
solving a problem?  Size of addressable market 
Technology/Product Risk: Can they build the product?  Proprietary position/competitive advantage 
Defensibility: If they get traction, can they keep out 
competitive pressures?  Management team 
Timing Risk: Is it too early?  Too late?  Location 
Entrepreneur Risk 3: Can they lead and recruit a team?  Execution Risk ‐‐ Experience with Start‐Ups 
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Entrepreneur Risk 4: Can they execute?  Execution Risk ‐‐ Experience with Business Model 
Market Size: Is the market big enough to grow?  Execution Risk ‐‐ Experience with Industry 
Market Risk 2: Market competition  Execution Risk  ‐‐ Experience with Company Leadership 
Market Risk 3: Political/Regulatory risks  Execution Risk ‐‐ Skin in the Game 
Exit Risk: How will we see our return? Exit/dividend, etc.?  Execution Risk ‐‐ Character of Principals 
Stage Risk: Is it too early to invest?  Execution Risk ‐‐ "X" Factor Instinct 
Business Model Risk:  Will people pay what entrepreneur 
thinks?  Market Risk ‐‐ Value Proposition 
Technology, product, or industry I don't understand  Market Risk ‐‐ Product/Service 
Exit strategy is unclear  Market Risk ‐‐ Marcoeconomic 
Experience level or track record of entrepreneur  Technology/Innovation Risk 
Ethics or honesty concerns with entrepreneur  Compeititve risk 
Fundamental concerns with business plan  Market Risk ‐‐ Business Model 
Intellectual property position  Financial risk ‐‐ Long term 
Limited market  Financial risk ‐‐ Current raise 
Inadequate funding to reach next milestone  Supply chain risk ‐‐ production 
Known business problem is being solved  Supply chain risk ‐‐ marcoeconomic 
Reasonable stated value proposition offerred to customers  Market Risk ‐‐ Value proposition 
Reasonable managment team in place depending on stage  Financial risk ‐‐ profitability 
Reasonable overall market opportunity  Exit risk ‐‐ Strategy 
Appropriate IP protection; barriers to entry  Exit risk ‐‐ Marco 
Great leader in place  Exit Risk ‐‐ Technology/Innovation 
Reasonable MVP available    
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Appendix C:  Full Listing of Survey #2 Results – Unranked 
 
Critical Risk Factor 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry 
Imp. + 
Frequency 
11.22 
Importance 
4.11 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Previous Startups 8.39 3.76 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Leadership 9.89 3.89 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience -Technical 8.61 3.44 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup 14.39 4.89 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Startups 8.78 3.5 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Business Model 9.06 3.65 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth 11.72 4.35 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute 13.5 4.82 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance 12.83 4.76 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founders desirous of liquidation and exit 9.47 3.83 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Open positions on management team 7.11 3.29 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Existence and quality of Advisory Board 7.33 3.28 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Strength of Business Plan 8.61 3.39 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones 11.22 4.22 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Operational execution relative to supply chain 6.61 3.24 
Relationship Factors - Coachability 13.22 4.82 
Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders 10.39 4.12 
Relationship Factors - Transparency 12.39 4.59 
Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit 10.17 4.18 
Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game' 12.17 4.5 
Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness 14.56 4.94 
Relationship Factors - Passion 13.11 4.67 
Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty 14.33 4.94 
Relationship Factors - Integrity 14.44 4.89 
Relationship Factors - Character 13.56 4.72 
Relationship Factors - "X" Factor Instincts 7.94 3.63 
Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size) 11.67 4.17 
Market Factors - Market Growth Rate 9.56 3.82 
Market Factors - Market Segmentation - Consolidated vs. Fractured 7.83 3.47 
Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy 12.72 4.39 
Market Factors - Product/Market Fit 12.5 4.59 
Market Factors - Timing in Market Life Cycle 9.22 3.71 
Market Factors - Understand of Macro Trends 8.78 4 
Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape 13.39 4.61 
Competitive Factors - Overall Number of Competitors 8.5 3.47 
Competitive Factors - Competitor Market Share 8.56 3.65 
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Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale 12.39 4.5 
Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth 11.61 4.47 
Scaleability Factors - Scale with Minimal Capital 9.06 3.71 
Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy 11.61 4.33 
Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction 10.61 4.06 
Traction and Revenue Factors - Existing Revenues 7.83 3.35 
Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model 12.67 4.39 
Technology Factors - Disruptive in  the Market 8.89 3.65 
Technology Factors - "Me too" Technology 7.22 3.4 
Technology Factors - Easily copied or reverse engineered 9.39 3.72 
Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype) 11 4.35 
Technology Factors - Development Timeline 9.5 4.13 
Technology Factors - Platform Technology 8.67 3.82 
Value Proposition Factors - Demonstrated Customer Discovery 10.44 4.25 
Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused 9.67 4.27 
Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Propostion 12.83 4.56 
Investment Factors - Amount of Investment 9.17 3.71 
Investment Factors - Valuation 11.44 4.17 
Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed 11.61 4.29 
Investment Factors - Terms 12 4.39 
Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table 10.11 4.06 
Investment Factors - Ability to attract co-investors 9.78 3.83 
Investment Factors - Realistic Return Expectations 10.33 4 
Investment Factors - M&A Landscape 6.83 3.29 
Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth 11.28 4.18 
Financial Factors - Realistic Pro Forma 9.33 3.76 
Financial Factors - Little or No Debt 8.28 3.53 
Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate 11.78 4.28 
Financial Factors - Projected Gross Margins 10.22 3.89 
Financial Factors - Clean Balance Sheet 9.33 3.82 
Exit Factors - Exit Strategy 11.33 4.11 
Exit Factors - Time to Exit 9.39 3.83 
Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return 13.67 4.61 
Exit Factors - Economic Conditions Favorable for Exit 8.56 3.71 
Exit Factors - Potential Disruptive Technology Affecting Exit 6.94 3.53 
Legal  Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation 12.44 4.56 
Legal  Factors - Founder's Need for NDA 7.11 3.28 
Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers 9.39 4 
Regulatory Factors - Political Risks 7.33 3.39 
Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP 10.17 4.11 
Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage 12.89 4.71 
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Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry 10.44 4.29 
Other Factors - Location of Company 8.33 3.47 
Other Factors - Wow Factor 6.94 3.25 
Other Factors - Intriguing Narrative 8.39 3.81 
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Appendix D:  Ranked Consensus Data by Consensus Range 
Ranked Consensus Data > 70%  
94% Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute 
  
5.00 
100% Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness 5.00 
100% Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty 4.94 
100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup 4.89 
100% Relationship Factors - Integrity 4.89 
94% Relationship Factors - Coachability 4.82 
94% Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance 4.76 
94% Relationship Factors - Character 4.72 
94% Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage 4.71 
100% Relationship Factors - Passion 4.67 
100% Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape 4.67 
94% Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return 4.67 
100% Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game' 4.61 
94% Relationship Factors - Transparency 4.59 
94% Market Factors - Product/Market Fit 4.59 
94% Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Propostion 4.56 
89% Legal  Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation 4.56 
89% Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth 4.53 
94% Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale 4.50 
94% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth 4.47 
89% Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model 4.44 
78% Value Proposition Factors - Demonstrated Customer Discovery 4.44 
100% Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy 4.39 
100% Investment Factors - Terms 4.39 
100% Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy 4.33 
100% Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype) 4.33 
89% Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed 4.29 
100% Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate 4.28 
100% Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry 4.28 
94% Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused 4.25 
100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones 4.22 
94% Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders 4.18 
83% Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit 4.18 
89% Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth 4.18 
94% Investment Factors - Valuation 4.17 
94% Technology Factors - Development Timeline 4.12 
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100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry 4.11 
100% Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size) 4.11 
94% Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table 4.11 
100% Exit Factors - Exit Strategy 4.11 
100% Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP 4.11 
94% Market Factors - Understand of Macro Trends 4.00 
89% Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction 4.00 
89% Investment Factors - Realistic Return Expectations 4.00 
100% Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers 4.00 
100% Technology Factors - Platform Technology 3.94 
100% Exit Factors - Time to Exit 3.94 
89% Financial Factors - Clean Balance Sheet 3.94 
89% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Leadership 3.89 
89% Technology Factors - Easily copied or reverse engioneered 3.89 
94% Financial Factors - Projected Gross Margins 3.89 
94% Market Factors - Market Growth Rate 3.88 
94% Investment Factors - Ability to attract co-investors 3.83 
83% Financial Factors - Realistic Pro Forma 3.82 
83% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founders desirous of liquidation and exit 3.78 
94% Exit Factors - Economic Conditions Favorable for Exit 3.76 
83% Other Factors - Intriguing Narrative 3.76 
83% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Previous Startups 3.71 
78% Market Factors - Timing in Market Life Cycle 3.71 
89% Scaleability Factors - Scale with Minimal Capital 3.71 
78% Investment Factors - Amount of Investment 3.71 
78% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Business Model 3.65 
78% Competitive Factors - Competitor Market Share 3.65 
78% Technology Factors - Disruptive in  the Market 3.65 
83% Financial Factors - Little or No Debt 3.65 
72% Exit Factors - Potential Disruptive Technology Affecting Exit 3.56 
72% Relationship Factors - "X" Factor Instincts 3.53 
78% Technology Factors - "Me too" Technology 3.53 
78% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Startups 3.50 
89% Market Factors - Market Segmentation - Consolidated vs. Fractured 3.47 
83% Other Factors - Location of Company 3.47 
94% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience -Technical 3.44 
72% Competitive Factors - Overall Number of Competitors 3.41 
100% Regulatory Factors - Political Risks 3.33 
89% Investment Factors - M&A Landscape 3.29 
89% Founders and Management Team Factors - Existence and quality of Advisory Board 3.28 
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94% Founders and Management Team Factors - Open positions on management team 3.24 
72% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Operational execution relative to supply 
chain 3.24 
78% Other Factors - Wow Factor 3.18 
   
 
Ranked Consensus Data > 80%  
94% Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute 5.00 
100% Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness 5.00 
100% Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty 4.94 
100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup 4.89 
100% Relationship Factors - Integrity 4.89 
94% Relationship Factors - Coachability 4.82 
94% Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance 4.76 
94% Relationship Factors - Character 4.72 
94% Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage 4.71 
100% Relationship Factors - Passion 4.67 
100% Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape 4.67 
94% Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return 4.67 
100% Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game' 4.61 
94% Relationship Factors - Transparency 4.59 
94% Market Factors - Product/Market Fit 4.59 
94% Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Propostion 4.56 
89% Legal  Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation 4.56 
89% Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth 4.53 
94% Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale 4.50 
94% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth 4.47 
89% Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model 4.44 
100% Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy 4.39 
100% Investment Factors - Terms 4.39 
100% Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy 4.33 
100% Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype) 4.33 
89% Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed 4.29 
100% Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate 4.28 
100% Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry 4.28 
94% Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused 4.25 
100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones 4.22 
94% Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders 4.18 
83% Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit 4.18 
89% Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth 4.18 
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94% Investment Factors - Valuation 4.17 
94% Technology Factors - Development Timeline 4.12 
100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry 4.11 
100% Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size) 4.11 
94% Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table 4.11 
100% Exit Factors - Exit Strategy 4.11 
100% Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP 4.11 
94% Market Factors - Understand of Macro Trends 4.00 
89% Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction 4.00 
89% Investment Factors - Realistic Return Expectations 4.00 
100% Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers 4.00 
100% Technology Factors - Platform Technology 3.94 
100% Exit Factors - Time to Exit 3.94 
89% Financial Factors - Clean Balance Sheet 3.94 
89% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Leadership 3.89 
89% Technology Factors - Easily copied or reverse engioneered 3.89 
94% Financial Factors - Projected Gross Margins 3.89 
94% Market Factors - Market Growth Rate 3.88 
94% Investment Factors - Ability to attract co-investors 3.83 
83% Financial Factors - Realistic Pro Forma 3.82 
83% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founders desirous of liquidation and 
exit 3.78 
94% Exit Factors - Economic Conditions Favorable for Exit 3.76 
83% Other Factors - Intriguing Narrative 3.76 
83% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Previous 
Startups 3.71 
89% Scaleability Factors - Scale with Minimal Capital 3.71 
83% Financial Factors - Little or No Debt 3.65 
89% Market Factors - Market Segmentation - Consolidated vs. Fractured 3.47 
83% Other Factors - Location of Company 3.47 
94% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience -Technical 3.44 
100% Regulatory Factors - Political Risks 3.33 
89% Investment Factors - M&A Landscape 3.29 
89% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Existence and quality of Advisory 
Board 3.28 
94% Founders and Management Team Factors - Open positions on management team 3.24 
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Ranked Consensus Data = 100%  
100% Relationship Factors – Trustworthiness 5.00 
100% Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty 4.94 
100% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to 
startup 4.89 
100% Relationship Factors – Integrity 4.89 
100% Relationship Factors – Passion 4.67 
100% Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape 4.67 
100% Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game' 4.61 
100% Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy 4.39 
100% Investment Factors – Terms 4.39 
100% Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy 4.33 
100% Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype) 4.33 
100% Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate 4.28 
100% Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry 4.28 
100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones 4.22 
100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry 4.11 
100% Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size) 4.11 
100% Exit Factors - Exit Strategy 4.11 
100% Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP 4.11 
100% Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers 4.00 
100% Technology Factors - Platform Technology 3.94 
100% Exit Factors - Time to Exit 3.94 
100% Regulatory Factors - Political Risks 3.33 
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Appendix E:  Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists 
Angel Investor Consensus Final Data   Venture Capitalist Consensus Final Data  
89% Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute 5.00  100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) commitment to startup 5.00 
89% Relationship Factors - Coachability 5.00  100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Ability to execute 5.00 
100% Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness 5.00  100% Relationship Factors - Trustworthiness 5.00 
100% Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty 5.00  100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance 4.89 
100% Relationship Factors - Integrity 5.00  100% Relationship Factors - Ethics/Honesty 4.89 
100% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder(s) 
commitment to startup 4.78  100% Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return 4.89 
100% Relationship Factors - Character 4.78  100% Relationship Factors - Company/Investor cultural fit 4.78 
100% Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape 4.78  100% Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game' 4.78 
78% Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage 4.75  100% Relationship Factors - Integrity 4.78 
100% Relationship Factors - Passion 4.67  100% Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model 4.78 
89% Founders and Management Team Factors - Perseverance 4.63  100% Relationship Factors - Coachability 4.67 
89% Relationship Factors - Transparency 4.63  100% Relationship Factors - Passion 4.67 
89% Market Factors - Product/Market Fit 4.63  100% Relationship Factors - Character 4.67 
100% Investment Factors - Terms 4.56  100% Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy 4.67 
89% Legal  Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation 4.56  100% Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale 4.67 
100% Relationship Factors - Management 'skin in the game' 4.44  100% Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth 4.67 
89% Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Proposition 4.44  100% Value Proposition Factors - Clear and Unique Value Propostion 4.67 
89% Exit Factors - Potential for Good Return 4.44  100% Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed 4.67 
78% Scaleability Factors - Strategy for Growth 4.38  100% Intellectual Property Factors - Competitive Advantage 4.67 
89% Scaleability Factors - Ability to Scale 4.33  89% Value Proposition Factors - Demonstrated Customer Discovery 4.63 
89% Investment Factors - Valuation 4.33  89% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's mindset toward growth 4.56 
100% Investment Factors - Realistic Return Expectations 4.22  89% Relationship Factors - Transparency 4.56 
100% Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP 4.22  100% Market Factors - Product/Market Fit 4.56 
100% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - 
Industry 4.11  100% Competitive Factors - Understanding of Competitive Landscape 4.56 
100% Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size) 4.11  100% Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy 4.56 
100% Market Factors - Go-to-market Strategy 4.11  100% Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype) 4.56 
100% Scaleability Factors - Sales Strategy 4.11  89% Legal  Factors - No Pending or Existing Litigation 4.56 
100% Traction and Revenue Factors - Revenue Model 4.11  89% Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused 4.50 
100% Technology Factors - MVP identified and available (Prototype) 4.11  100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and Milestones 4.44 
100% Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate 4.11  89% Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders 4.44 
100% Exit Factors - Exit Strategy 4.11  89% Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth 4.44 
100% Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry 4.11  100% Financial Factors - Reasonable Burn Rate 4.44 
100% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Strategic Metrics and 
Milestones 4.00  100% Intellectual Property Factors - Other Barriers to Entry 4.44 
100% Technology Factors - Platform Technology 4.00  100% Technology Factors - Development Timeline 4.33 
100% Value Proposition Factors - Problem, Not Solution Focused 4.00  100% Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers 4.33 
100% Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table 4.00  100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Leadership 4.22 
100% Financial Factors - Projected Gross Margins 3.89  100% Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction 4.22 
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89% Relationship Factors - Relationship between founders 3.88  100% Investment Factors - Terms 4.22 
89% Market Factors - Market Growth Rate 3.88  89% Investment Factors - Clean Cap Table 4.22 
89% Market Factors - Understand of Macro Trends 3.88  100% Exit Factors - Time to Exit 4.22 
89% Technology Factors - Development Timeline 3.88  100% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - Industry 4.11 
78% Investment Factors - Follow-on Funding Needed 3.88  100% Market Factors - Total Addressable Market (Size) 4.11 
78% Investment Factors - Investment Stage - Seed, Early Growth 3.88  100% Market Factors - Understand of Macro Trends 4.11 
100% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - 
Previous Startups 3.78  89% Financial Factors - Clean Balance Sheet 4.11 
78% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founders desirous of 
liquidation and exit 3.78  100% Exit Factors - Exit Strategy 4.11 
89% Technology Factors - Easily copied or reverse engioneered 3.78  89% Technology Factors - Easily copied or reverse engioneered 4.00 
100% Investment Factors - Ability to attract co-investors 3.78  100% Investment Factors - Valuation 4.00 
78% Traction and Revenue Factors - Early Traction 3.75  100% Intellectual Property Factors - Existing IP 4.00 
89% Financial Factors - Clean Balance Sheet 3.75  100% Other Factors - Intriguing Narrative 4.00 
100% Exit Factors - Time to Exit 3.67  100% Market Factors - Market Growth Rate 3.89 
100% Regulatory Factors - Regulatory Barriers 3.67  89% Competitive Factors - Competitor Market Share 3.89 
78% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - 
Business Model 3.63  89% Scaleability Factors - Scale with Minimal Capital 3.89 
78% Market Factors - Timing in Market Life Cycle 3.63  100% Technology Factors - Platform Technology 3.89 
78% Technology Factors - Disruptive in  the Market 3.63  89% Investment Factors - Ability to attract co-investors 3.89 
78% Investment Factors - Amount of Investment 3.63  100% Financial Factors - Realistic Pro Forma 3.89 
78% Exit Factors - Economic Conditions Favorable for Exit 3.63  89% Financial Factors - Little or No Debt 3.89 
78% Exit Factors - Potential Disruptive Technology Affecting Exit 3.63 89% Financial Factors - Projected Gross Margins 3.89 
78% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - 
Leadership 3.63  100% Exit Factors - Economic Conditions Favorable for Exit 3.89 
100% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience -
Technical 3.56  89% Founders and Management Team Factors - Founders desirous of liquidation 3.78 
78% 
Founders and Management Team Factors - Founder's Experience - 
Startups 3.56  78% Market Factors - Timing in Market Life Cycle 3.78 
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